


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JPRS-USA-84-009

16 October 1984



# USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 6, June 1984

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16 October 1984

## USSR REPORT

## USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 6, June 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA published in Moscow by the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY  
No 6, June 1984

Russian title : SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : V. M. Berezhev

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo "Nauka"

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : June 1984

Signed to press : 24 May 1984

Copies : 30,000

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politika, ideologiya", 1984

## REAGAN SHIFT FROM NEW DEAL EMPLOYMENT POLICIES VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 84  
(signed to press 24 May 84) pp 3-15

[Article by L. T. Dukhovnaya (Donetsk): "The Bourgeois Government and Unemployment: The United States in the 1980's"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] In the postwar decades the policy of the U.S. Government on unemployment has been revised periodically in line with the state of the economy and of social and class relations, processes in the labor market, the development of the technological revolution and the prevailing economic and sociopolitical views. A change in priorities has been accompanied by some changes in the regulating machinery of the labor market, in the scales and specific aims of government socioeconomic activity and in the degree of government influence on the development and use of labor resources. The chief and most radically differing phases of government policy in the manpower market are the liberal-reformist phase and the present one, the conservative phase.

The changes in American government attitudes toward unemployment since the start of the Reagan Administration were part of the general rightward shift in government policy. Relying on the monopolies and supported by the petty bourgeoisie and other middle strata dissatisfied with sizeable government expenditures on socioeconomic needs (particularly to combat unemployment), which were raising the already high taxes, the Republican administration launched a broad-scale attack on the basic aims and practices of its predecessors, against the gains of the working public and against the influence of labor unions in order to redistribute national income in favor of monopolist capital and to establish even more favorable conditions for the accumulation and augmentation of profits.

It is significant that the regulation of the labor market, which K. Marx described as "a special subdivision of the commodity market,"<sup>1</sup> encompasses a group of means of influencing employment and unemployment. It is nevertheless correct to make specific references to government policy on unemployment because it is always based on a specific view of the role and permissible scales of unemployment.

This article will examine the purpose, causes and possible limits of the conservative shift in the regulation of unemployment by the U.S. Government. A

brief account of the previous phase of regulation will provide a clearer idea of this shift.

### The Liberal-Reformist Phase of Regulation

We should recall that U.S. government policy on unemployment began to take shape and develop in the 1930's. At that time the need to establish favorable conditions for the economy's emergence from an extremely severe crisis motivated American ruling circles to arm themselves with the Keynesian postulates concerning the active role of government in economic development. At the time of F. Roosevelt's New Deal, laws were passed on unemployment compensation, public works programs were launched and a federal and state job placement service was created. After the war the government's means of influencing the level and scales of unemployment were augmented and differentiated considerably. The development of the technological revolution from the second half of the 1950's on, the substantial changes in the economic structure and the urgent need to improve and expand the occupational training system all required considerable changes in the machinery of the capitalist economy under the conditions of the increasingly severe general crisis of capitalism and necessitated the adaptation of this economy to these new conditions. Government functions began to include the maintenance of a specific balance between the active and reserve categories of manpower in order to prevent the EXCESSIVE growth of unemployment, which could give rise to new social upheavals, and to provide labor with occupational training to meet the changing requirements of the economy.

This goal was officially announced when a 1946 law on employment obligated the federal government to take various measures to regulate employment, including the maintenance of an economic growth rate to secure "full employment" in the nation. Furthermore, according to official doctrine, "full employment" meant that 3.5-4 percent of the total labor force would be unemployed, according to official calculations (applying only to individuals registered with labor exchanges).

The pursuit of the policy of "full employment" was facilitated by the relatively favorable conditions of reproduction in the first postwar decades: The relatively low cost and the accessibility of raw materials and energy, the accelerated growth of new sectors, types and spheres of production, the relative stability of prices and the comparatively high level of domestic and international economic activity. Under these conditions, government actions in the labor market and the increase in government expenditures for socio-economic purposes, particularly the reduction of unemployment, helped to lower the rate somewhat (to 3.5 percent by the end of the 1960's).

Allocations for various programs in this sphere began to be augmented substantially in the middle of the 1960's: Federal expenditures between 1963 and 1975 totaled 14.4 billion dollars. Furthermore, the very sphere of government intervention became much broader. Government programs for the occupational training of manpower and for the creation of jobs in the public sector were among the employment regulating measures that were instituted on a fairly broad scale. By the beginning of the 1970's, for example, a total

of around 25 vocational training and retraining programs, completely or partially financed by the government, had been set up for the unemployed and for young people. During the 1960's government activity in this sphere evolved from a series of episodic and unrelated measures dictated by current economic needs into a permanent part of state-monopolist economic regulation with an emphasis on the long range.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to working out these programs, the government had to take measures in the sphere of unemployment insurance--that is, to allocate funds for the support of the jobless. A law passed on 31 December 1974 at a time of economic crisis, for example, allowed the maximum 26-week unemployment compensation term to be extended for another 13 weeks if the national rate of unemployment should fail to fall below 6 percent for 3 months in a row. This law also envisaged the possibility of temporarily extending this insurance to categories of workers who had usually been ineligible for this compensation (agricultural laborers, domestic workers and state and local government employees). In May 1975 the insurance for some categories of unemployed was extended for another 13 weeks.<sup>3</sup>

The crises of the 1970's, the intensification of structural disparities and the appearance of some fundamentally new features in the reserve labor force (the expansion of the social boundaries of unemployment, the tendency toward its growth even during phases of cyclical recovery and upswing, changes in the demand for workers in specific occupations and with specific skills, as a result of which a large portion of the unemployed labor force ceased to be an immediate manpower reserve, and so forth) exacerbated the unemployment problem considerably and made it one of the main sociopolitical issues in the United States.<sup>4</sup> The extreme inadequacy of the measures used in the 1960's to restrict the growth of unemployment became particularly apparent.

Under these conditions, the successive administrations of the 1970's gradually expanded direct government participation in the resolution of the unemployment problem. This generally took the form of public works programs and occupational training courses. In 1977-1979, for example, these programs were designed to create 11.819 million jobs and training course slots. Projected expenditures for the 3 years were 27.713 million dollars.<sup>5</sup> The actual increase in training slots and jobs, however, was only 59 percent of the projected figure. The impact of these expenditures also fell far short of expectations. One important factor diminishing the impact of the programs was the tendency to use local and state government funds for other purposes. Only an extremely low percentage was actually used directly in the reduction of the constant growth of unemployment. The inadequate impact of expenditures on public works programs, the inadequate results of occupational training courses (expenditures on these were reduced when unemployment climbed sharply during the 1974-1975 crisis to provide more funds for the creation of short-term and frequently unskilled jobs) and the increase of unemployment among the graduates of colleges and universities as well as high school graduates attested to the diminished impact of government socioeconomic policy in the complex atmosphere of the 1970's.

Even at that time there was a tendency to depart from the official policy of "full employment." Bourgeois analysts and government experts persistently



proposed that the criterion be raised from 3.5-4 percent to 5-5.5 percent. At the beginning of 1977, for example, the new Carter Administration announced that one of its main priorities would be the reduction of the national rate of unemployment to only the 5-percent level.

Experience proved, however, that the federal government was not capable of maintaining even these expanded parameters of "full employment." Over the postwar period as a whole, the rate of unemployment was invariably higher in the United States than in the majority of other developed capitalist countries. The rate of increase in relative overpopulation rose dramatically in the 1970's. During this decade the average rate of unemployment rose from 3.5 percent to 6 percent. Between 1970 and 1982 alone, 84.7 million Americans (average annual figure) lost their jobs at least once. This figure is equivalent to the entire active portion of the civilian labor force in 1975.<sup>6</sup>

All of this attested to the government's inability to solve the unemployment problem with traditional Keynesian methods. Their general and unselective nature, designed for the labor force typical of the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's, diminished their impact on unemployment under the conditions of increasingly complex labor demand patterns and substantial changes in the supply of manpower. The overall deterioration of the conditions of capitalist reproduction in the 1970's also played an important role. The policy of social maneuvering grew increasingly costly and burdensome not only for big capital, which had always been extremely reluctant to accept it, but also for the mass middle strata. As a result of all these factors, the machinery that had been used for two decades to regulate employment and unemployment turned out to be useless.

#### The Conservative Shift

The late 1970's and early 1980's were a turning point in the development of the American economy in general and the labor market in particular. The deep-seated, long-term factors which had promoted the growth of unemployment in the nation and had been engendered by capitalist conditions of economic management were supplemented by new factors, such as the structural reorganization of production, the extensive introduction of labor-saving and energy-saving equipment in many spheres of economic activity, the stepped-up automation of production divisions, shops and enterprises and the decline of American commercial influence in the international market. Capitalism's inevitable disparities between manpower demand and supply acquired unprecedented--since the early 1930's--scale at the time of the cyclical crisis of the early 1980's. In 1982 alone, almost one out of every four workers lost at least one job.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, whereas the rate of unemployment for men was 7.4 percent that year, it was 8.2 percent for women and 17 percent for young workers (up to the age of 24).<sup>8</sup> The crisis struck a sizeable portion of the economy but it had a particularly severe effect on traditional sectors employing hundreds of thousands of workers. In December 1982, for example, the ranks of the unemployed included 29.2 percent of the workers of the metallurgical industry, 23.2 percent of the workers of the automotive industry, etc. In January 1984, when the cyclical upswing had already begun, there were more than 9 million completely unemployed individuals in the nation, representing

around 8.2 percent of the entire labor force. The average period of unemployment was of much longer duration after increasing from 11.9 weeks in 1980 to 19.5 weeks in August 1982.<sup>9</sup> This essentially meant an increase in steady unemployment, the rate of which depends little on fluctuations in economic conditions. This has given rise to relative overpopulation on a new and unprecedented scale. Furthermore, this has shown little tendency toward reduction even when economic conditions improve and it is turning into a chronic problem.

The lower main indicators of the American economy's efficiency and the more frequent "interruptions" in its functioning, accompanied by a rate of increase in unemployment unprecedented in the postwar period, have motivated bourgeois economists and politicians to seek and consider new varieties of state-monopolist regulation and more effective ways and means of influencing the profitability and maneuverability of private enterprise and of adapting it to existing conditions. The government's attitude toward unemployment problems has also undergone significant changes. The Republican administration's chief policy aims with regard to the economy in general and unemployment in particular were set forth in Ronald Reagan's well-known document "A New Beginning for America. A Program of Economic Recovery," which has become something like a manifesto of the most conservative rightwing segments of the ruling class.

What kind of changes has government policy on unemployment undergone under the present administration? What are its methods, aims and impact?

FROM "FULL EMPLOYMENT" TO "NATURAL UNEMPLOYMENT." One of the most important changes occurred when the Reagan Administration ceased to view "full employment" as the aim of its socioeconomic measures. To validate this departure from earlier policy, the Republicans re-emphasized the neoclassical school of bourgeois political economy's thesis about the "natural" percentage of unemployment. This is less an admission of the natural need for a specific percentage of unemployed in the capitalist economy (Keynesianism did not deny this either) than the calculation of this natural rate according to market forces and patterns of supply and demand. A percentage of unemployment which does not raise prices was considered to be "natural." In this line of reasoning, it is significant that price increases are related to wage dynamics. According to these economists and their adherents, the slower growth of wages and the reduction of the proportion of production costs they represent will keep prices from rising, stabilizing price levels, and this should create favorable conditions for an increase in employment and a decrease in unemployment.

Here we should note that the current phase of state-monopolist economic regulation in the United States, just as in several other Western countries, is related in general to the new emphasis on action to combat inflation, which a government might choose to take even at the cost of a significant rise in unemployment. Chairman M. Feldstein of the U.S. President's Council of Economic Advisers declared that "it will take a certain period of increased unemployment and economic recession to overcome today's inflation."<sup>10</sup>

When the government was taking a liberal course of action in the U.S. economy, the permissible increase in unemployment was quite precisely limited to 3-4 percent of the labor force. In the theoretical constructs of the monetarists who support the notion of "natural unemployment," however, the matter is viewed quite differently: The rate of unemployment should rise until prices are stabilized. Various researchers have set different quantitative limits on these changes, but they usually go as high as 7-8 percent of the labor force.

The departure from the aim of "full employment" also presupposed some change in the methods and forms of regulation characteristic of the liberal period, including the machinery for their "precision tuning" to meet economic needs, public works programs and the stimulation of economic growth rates through the creation of "effective demand." The reduction of unemployment was made directly dependent on the stabilization of prices and the reduction of the government budget deficit, as well as on the improvement of conditions for the development of private enterprise, and not on purposeful actions by the government in the sphere of unemployment. This put the emphasis on indirect, rather than direct, methods and means of government influence on unemployment.

FROM DIRECT TO INDIRECT REGULATION. At the time of the shift to a conservative policy and to an emphasis on "natural unemployment" at the beginning of the 1980's, many federal programs of previous years for the creation of jobs (in the public sector), occupational training, unemployment insurance and the corresponding allocations were either reduced substantially or stopped altogether. Indirect methods became prominent among government measures to influence the economy and the labor market.

The federal government began by reviewing the experience of previous administrations in the stimulation of business activity. It attempted to reduce steady unemployment by offering companies broader tax credits and subsidies designed specifically to reduce the production costs that inevitably increase as a result of the more active hiring of individuals who have been unemployed for a long time. Now the tax credit is supposed to compensate the firm for 50 percent of the wages paid in the first year to the hired unemployed individual and for 25 percent of the wages paid to him in the second year. To reduce the scales of summer unemployment among youth, businessmen were offered tax credits in the amount of up to 85 percent of the wages paid to young people. Besides this, the minimum wage for young men and women under the age of 22 was reduced from \$3.35 to \$2.50 between 1 May and 30 September 1983. As a result, the amount spent by companies to pay young people hired for summer jobs was no more than 50 cents an hour per worker ( $100\% - 85\% = 15\%$ ;  $15\%$  of  $\$2.50 = 37.5$  cents). Employers were essentially receiving manpower for free. These measures were supposed to aid in the creation of, for example, around 718,000 new jobs in the 1983 summer season.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the government has not given up its actions in the labor market but is combining them with measures designed to reduce expenditures on manpower.

To stimulate the development of commercial enterprise in regions where the rate of unemployment is higher than the national average, the government planned the creation of so-called commercial zones. This would represent a

"package" of measures to stimulate business activity. This idea, however, has been subjected to valid criticism by the labor unions, which "have insisted on the development of programs designed specifically to solve the problems of unemployment and depressed communities,"<sup>12</sup> and not to satisfy business interests, and even by some bourgeois analysts. According to specialists from the American Urban Institute, for example, the impact of these "little Hong Kongs" is negligible. They offer virtually nothing to small and medium-sized businesses, which constitute most of the local business sector. Besides this, present plans call for the creation of only 75 such zones on the federal level, but the number of depressed regions now stands at around 2,000.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, as a special report of this institute points out, "no decision has been made as to what will become of the remaining 96 percent of these regions during the experiment with the commercial zones."<sup>14</sup> It is completely obvious that regional unemployment problems, which have grown much more severe in recent years, cannot be solved to any significant extent by such partial, small-scale undertakings.

THE "DECENTRALIZATION" OF THE REGULATORY SYSTEM. Another new aspect of government policy is the transfer of part of the authority and all of the responsibility for the resolution of unemployment problems to state and local government agencies. These measures are part of Ronald Reagan's "new federalism."<sup>15</sup> As part of its efforts to "decentralize" regulation in the sphere of labor resources, the administration has been curtailing federal aid to state and local governments in the financing of employment programs. For example, the cut in expenditures on the most important type of aid--"education, occupational training, employment and social services"--was supposed to amount to 41.7 percent, or 8.8 billion dollars, in fiscal years 1981-1983. There were even more sizeable cuts in aid to cities. It was cut by 56 percent just in fiscal year 1982.

Advertising the extensive capabilities of states, counties, cities and districts to solve unemployment problems, Washington has officially attempted, FIRSTLY, to blame the severe employment crisis on "misinformation" received by and from the labor market. The federal guide to local government investment strategy says: "Insufficient information has created a shortage of manpower in regions of rapid economic growth, but there is also an obvious chronic surplus of labor in regions with a prevalence of obsolete or ageing industries."<sup>16</sup> In connection with this, measures have been proposed for the better organization of the collection of data on the local level and for the more efficient use of information. For example, a federal agency planning board is drafting special instructions on organizational assistance to local government in the resolution of employment problems, in personnel training and in the stimulation of commercial activity. SECONDLY, the federal government wants to convince the public that it has no way of knowing and considering all local peculiarities and that this is supposedly the reason why its socioeconomic activity might have little impact and even complicate the fight against unemployment.

As we can see, the federal government is trying to categorize solutions to the SOCIAL problem of unemployment as ordinary ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES. Of course, the organization of labor supply and demand analysis will be necessary

for the normal mobility of manpower in the labor market. In this case, however, official propaganda has an exclusively class aim--to transfer the blame for mass unemployment from capitalism as a social order to faulty information about the labor market and the excessive centralization of various functions on the federal level.

**OCCUPATIONAL TRAINING.** An important new aspect of government policy was a different approach to the assessment of education and occupational training as a factor in the reduction of unemployment.

We should recall that the increased government expenditures on education and occupational training in the 1960's were supposed to solve many social problems, particularly the limitation of the growth of unemployment, the elimination of the causes of steady unemployment and the better coordination of labor demand and supply patterns. As President L. Johnson announced, "the answer to all of our problems is, in a word, education."<sup>17</sup> In the 1970's, however, the federal government began to pay less attention to the organization of occupational training and retraining courses and programs, and there was a shift in emphasis from structural to anti-crisis measures (particularly public works programs) to lower the rate of unemployment. Inadequate allocations for training courses at a time of substantial structural changes in the economy naturally had a perceptible effect on the occupational skills of the labor force. Their increasing lack of correspondence to changing labor demand patterns became a strong factor in the growth of structural unemployment. The need for the thorough and purposeful reorganization of the existing occupational training system grew urgent.

The new Reagan Administration, however, resolved to limit federal government intervention in the development of labor resources. Federal expenditures on the education and training of manpower were cut dramatically. In fiscal year 1983, for example, they totaled 1.8 billion dollars, representing a cut of 44 percent in the 1981 figure. Federal funds for adult education and occupational training in fiscal year 1986 will be almost 63 percent below the 1982 figure: Expenditures will decrease from 818 million dollars to 515 million.<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, cuts in federal allocations were accompanied by criticism of the counterproductive actions of previous administrations, their tendency to squander funds and use them indiscriminately, and the inadequate maneuverability of the machinery of state. Officially, the new machinery of influence on the qualitative features of manpower is supposed to save government funds, ensure their more efficient use, establish a stronger connection between occupational training and job placement services and reduce the drop-out rate in education.

Government agencies hope to achieve the efficient use of funds primarily through the reorganization of expenditure patterns. The amount allocated directly for education in previous programs was only 18 percent of the total. The rest was used for grants, various services and the maintenance of the administrative system. According to government experts, this system for the distribution of funds diminished their impact. This is why all expenditures

with no direct relationship to the educational process have been eliminated from new programs. In 1984 these expenditure patterns are expected to create 406,000 educational slots, and not the previous 303,000 (per academic year).<sup>19</sup> To avoid the dissipation of funds among various minor programs, federal allocations are being concentrated in "program blocks" transferred to states to be used at their own discretion.

These measures might appear to be purposeful and efficient, but a more careful look reveals that they are designed not so much for the conservation of federal funds as for an assault on the laboring public's position, the infringement of its interests and the creation of stronger dependence on capital. This reflects the Republican leadership's general line of unleashing spontaneous market forces, reinforcing capital's domination of the labor market and putting the laboring public in an unstable position. For instance, what is to become of students whose only source of income--the grant--is eliminated? "Is it possible," labor union spokesmen ask, "that families have to starve for 90 days while the head of the family attends occupation training courses?"<sup>20</sup> There is no question that the retraining opportunities of many people have been sharply restricted.

In fall 1982 the administration pushed a law through Congress on partnership in on-the-job training, which, just as the 1973 act on universal employment and occupational training, is designed to decentralize the administration of programs in this sphere. In accordance with this law, the actual management, organization and coordination of training programs with a view to local business needs have been made the responsibility of 460 industrial councils set up in 1978. Their members, appointed by state governors, include representatives of the business and academic communities, labor unions, local communities and employment agencies. The councils were set up essentially to coordinate occupational training with the demand of specific firms for personnel of certain occupations and with certain skills. The general assumption was that capital's need for skilled workers would engender greater interest in their training and subsequent placement. The authorities hope that this reorganized system for the modification of the qualitative features of the labor force with the aim of limiting the growth of unemployment will be more effective and less costly.

To give capital an incentive to organize the training of the necessary manpower, primarily in regions where new enterprises are being opened, the law specifically envisages federal allocations of 240 million dollars to the states in fiscal year 1984 for the retraining and resettlement of 96,000 people whose jobs have been eliminated. The ridiculously low number of people covered by the law testifies that this measure was designed more to uphold the administration's political prestige than to actually reduce the scales of unemployment.

It is not surprising that the plans to secure manpower training and to thereby reduce the scales of unemployment turned out to be unrealistic in the atmosphere of economic crisis of the early 1980's and of the sharp reduction in the number of vacant employment positions, the stepped-up growth of unemployment and the wave of bankruptcies. It is understandable that business was

reluctant to take more responsibility in this area. American observers noted the "desire of industrial councils to limit their authority in this sphere and their reluctance to take on the responsibility of administering billions of federal dollars even after the government had authorized them to control the use of these funds."<sup>21</sup> Describing the majority of councils as "paper organizations," American experts suggested that these bodies could assist in the placement of the most highly trained personnel at best, but could not be counted on at all to solve, for example, the problems of chronic or steady unemployment. It is not surprising that the partnership law did not start to be implemented until a year after its passage--that is, when the economy had already entered the phase of cyclical recovery.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE. The unemployment compensation system was also restricted substantially. The 1981 law excluded the possibility of extending the compensation payment term on the national scale, limiting the use of extension possibilities to the boundaries of individual states. Administration proposals regarding more rigid terms of unemployment insurance were widely debated. In his "program for economic recovery," Reagan suggested the revision of the concept of "suitable work," the absence of which served as official grounds for the extension of the compensation payment term: "People who cannot find a job similar to their previous one within 3 months must consent to take any other job, even if it pays less than the previous one."<sup>22</sup> According to those who supported more rigid compensation terms, the extension of the payment period was keeping the unemployed from looking for work and was promoting an unjustifiably high concentration of unemployed individuals in some sectors while others were suffering from a manpower shortage. The crux of the matter was that the reduction of the compensation term would reduce the social expenditures of employers and the government, despite the growth of the unemployed labor force, would put more pressure on wages, would diminish union influence and would thereby augment the authority and strength of capital.

In accordance with this aim, proposed changes in legislation envisaged tax credits for employers so that the wages paid to individuals hired after long periods of unemployment will not exceed unemployment compensation amounts. Therefore, the laboring public is being offered harsh terms for which there is virtually no alternative: Workers can either become ineligible for compensation by refusing a job offer or agree to take a job paying wages equivalent to unemployment compensation.

#### Objective Limits of the Departure from Earlier Policy

The Republican administration's own labor market regulation practices have also undergone perceptible changes. An obvious departure from its previous priorities and plans and the adoption of means and methods from the old Keynesian baggage were already apparent in 1982 and 1983. This evolution is taking place in an atmosphere of continued inflexibility in relations with labor unions, a high rate of unemployment and a decrease in real wages--that is, in an atmosphere extremely unfavorable for millions of workers.

In connection with this, there are questions about the reversibility of government unemployment regulation as part of the development of state-monopoly capitalism and about the limits of the bourgeois government's

attack on the socioeconomic gains of the laboring public in the employment sphere--in other words, questions about the permissible "angle of deviation" from the policy of previous decades.

First of all, it is significant that even during the first year of its existence the Republican administration did not consider giving up the obligations imposed on the government by the 1946 employment act. The official adoption of the concept of the "natural" percentage of unemployment attested only to an admission of the fact that its level, which had been high even before, was now much higher and that each consecutive year of struggle to lower it with the aid of the methods of the 1960's and 1970's was producing less results and was costing the government more. Here "Reaganomics" signified only the denial of the KEYNESIAN aims of unemployment regulation, but not the actual need to influence the scales of unemployment. While the administration and its economic advisers have been creating even more favorable conditions in the private sector for stepped-up accumulations and the reorganization of production, they have invariably listed the expansion of employment opportunities and the reduction of unemployment among the principal aims of this policy. The continued growth of unemployment as a result of the severe cyclical crisis, as mentioned above, motivated the government to attempt to influence the labor market more intensively than it had originally planned.

As for the DEGREE of possible deviation from the previous official theory and practices in the unemployment sphere, the elucidation of this matter requires the investigation of many objective factors which contributed in some way to the conservative shift in the policy of state-monopoly capitalism in this sphere and which have already been discussed above. During the implementation of the conservative variety of state-monopoly capitalism, however, some Republican theories about the economy and the labor market began to restrict the possibility of ruling circles to deviate from concessions made earlier to the laboring public under the influence of the class struggle, revealing the limits of the possible "angle of deviation" from the liberal-reformist line.

The SOCIAL limitation on the conservative shift was, just as in the 1930's, the dominant class' fear of a more acute conflict between labor and capital, the fear of new disturbances in black ghettos and the fear of new social upheavals. The events of recent years in the nation--marches and rallies by the unemployed, the unions' active struggle for the right to work, the mass peace movement and the demands for the creation of new jobs instead of missiles and bombs--testify that many of these fears are justified.

The ECONOMIC limits on the conservative shift cannot be confined only to society's losses as a result of lower tax revenues and higher unemployment compensation payments, although these do constitute sizeable sums. The economic limits of the rightward shift in the unemployment sphere depend primarily on the level of maturity in the social nature of labor, which is reflected in the social forms of manpower reproduction regulation, particularly the occupational training and productive use of manpower. These keep the private sector from gaining total control over the labor market and over the qualitative features of the labor force. The liberal-reformist phase of



regulation reflected the objective need for the centralized management of the labor force, engendered by the heightened maturity of the social nature of production. The conservative line, on the other hand, was geared from the very beginning to artificial disregard for this extremely important factor.

Conservative aims also contributed a great deal to the present tension in the labor market, and even American officials acknowledged the real possibility of the maintenance of a high level of unemployment for a long time. For example, Chairman M. Feldstein of the Council of Economic Advisers stressed: "Economic recovery is certain to lower the level of unemployment but it cannot completely solve the problem."<sup>23</sup> This is also the view of many economists. "The rate of unemployment could gradually decline," said, for example, Nobel Prizewinner L. Klein, "but this will not happen before the end of the decade. And even then, it will only drop to the 5- or 6-percent point at which the current rise began at the end of the 1970's."<sup>24</sup> Facts are confirming the validity of these predictions. Despite the beginning of a cyclical economic upswing in fall 1983, unemployment is still a reality for millions of Americans.

For all of these reasons, the Republican administration has not only had to acknowledge that the present state of affairs is serious, but has also had to revise some of its original tactics, even though its measures are obviously mere palliatives which are accompanied by various provisos and are only a trump card in the political struggle and in the new election campaign.

This applies, for example, to public works programs. As early as February 1983, administration members negotiated a preliminary agreement with several Democratic congressmen on a short-term public works program for 125,000 jobs, and in March the President signed a bill on this program.<sup>25</sup> It is completely obvious that this is a drop in the bucket now that millions of people are unemployed.

What is more, the Reagan Administration apparently did not want to intensify social conflicts and could not carry out its plans to limit the concept of "suitable work" in connection with the extension of unemployment compensation terms. Furthermore, when unemployment continued to grow and exceeded projected figures, the administration had to extend the previous maximum term by another 16 weeks. This measure, however, was in effect only until 31 March 1983 and, besides this, it was followed by administration proposals regarding the use of some of the compensation to organize occupational retraining courses for the unemployed and the collection of information about the number and nature of job vacancies.

Therefore, the limits of the government's departure from the earlier framework and aims of the liberal-reformist variety of regulation depend on the comprehensive influence of socioeconomic, scientific, technical and political factors, the objective requirements of the development of productive forces, the resistance of monopoly pressure by the workers, their earlier gains in the social sphere and social progress itself. As a result, even under the conditions of an active assault by ruling circles on the positions of the laboring public, the capitalist government's conservative line can no longer accomplish the total reversal of socioeconomic policy or completely turn the

resolution of the unemployment problem over to spontaneous market forces. The government can no longer act totally in accordance with the requirements of its own theories, subjective intentions and announced programs. The "wages of fear" and imperatives of social production compel the government to change its policy and practices.

There is no question that the specific forms and methods by which the bourgeois government influences unemployment and its organizational and economic machinery as a component of state-monopoly economic regulation will continue to undergo changes in the future. It is not likely that the conservative line will be the last or crowning phase of government policy in this sphere. In spite of the inevitable continued evolution of the forms and methods of state-monopolist influence on unemployment and its changing role and place in the system of government socioeconomic measures, the class purpose of this aspect of state-monopoly capitalism will remain the same--the creation of more favorable conditions for the functioning of capital and its adaptation to changing conditions of reproduction for the reinforcement of the bases of capitalism. At the same time, it is completely obvious that the policy of state-monopoly capitalism in this sphere in all of its specific varieties is largely ineffective. The multimillion-strong army of unemployed is not only an accompanying factor of American and world capitalism, but a "built-in," organically inherent factor.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," 2d ed, vol 23, p 180.
2. For more detail, see S. I. Zapadinskaya, "Government Policy in the Training and Use of Manpower," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1975, No 6--Editor's note.
3. "Unemployment Compensation and Related Employment Policy Measures. General Report and Country Studies," OECD, Paris, 1979, pp 48, 51.
4. Gallup Institute surveys indicate that unemployment has invariably been called one of the American society's main problems since 1975--GALLUP REPORT, No 213, June 1983, p 5.
5. Calculated according to "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980," Wash., 1981, p 177.
6. Calculated according to "Economic Report of the President, February 1983," p 202.
7. NEWSWEEK, 16 May 1983, p 44.
8. OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, July 1983, p 46.
9. Calculated according to "Employment and Earnings, U.S. Department of Labor, September 1983," Wash., p 6.

10. "The American Economy in Transition," ed by M. Feldstein, Chicago-London, 1980, p 5.
11. "Budget of the United States Government. FY 1984," Wash., 1983, p 5-95.
12. AFL-CIO NEWS, 20 February 1982.
13. A report on the commercial zones will appear in a coming issue--Editor's note.
14. "The Reagan Experiment. Report of the Urban Institute's Changing Domestic Priorities Project," Wash., 1982, p 267.
15. See A. A. Volodin, "The Reagan Administration's 'New Federalism,'" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 10; Ye. P. Ionova, "The States and the Reversals of Ronald Reagan's 'New Federalism,'" ibid., 1984, No 5--Editor's note.
16. "State and Local Investment Strategy. A Policy Maker's Guide to Their Design," Wash., 1981, p 11.
17. THE NEW REPUBLIC, 31 March 1982, p 31.
18. "The Reagan Experiment," p 258.
19. "Budget of the United States Government," p 5-95.
20. IRON AGE, 13 April 1983, p 20.
21. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS WEEK, 20 September 1982, p 93.
22. "America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery," Wash., 1981, p 24.
23. ACROSS THE BOARD, December 1982, p 30.
24. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 31 January 1983, p 69.
25. TIME, 21 February 1983, p 31; WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, vol 19, No 12, 28 March 1983, pp 451, 465.

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## REAGAN LATIN AMERICAN POLICY SAID PART OF EAST-WEST CONFLICT

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 24 May 84) pp 16-28

[Article by A. N. Glinkin: "U.S. Imperialism's Current Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean"]

[Text] 1. The Policy of Interventionism and Aggression

Many facts provide grounds for the conclusion that since the beginning of the 1980's Latin America and, in particular, the Caribbean subregion have ranked higher on the scale of Washington's strategic priority than they did in the past. Primary significance has been attached to the reinforcement of direct U.S. military presence here. Washington's Latin American policy has become much more aggressive. The Reagan Administration has moved from methods of economic and diplomatic pressure to the organization of large-scale subversive operations against sovereign states in the region, the augmentation of the U.S. military presence in "hot spots," the use of the tactic of undeclared wars and the organization of overt armed intervention against states choosing a course of independent development. This has heightened tension throughout Latin America, and particularly in the Caribbean zone, which became the new center of regional revolutionary processes in the second half of the 1970's.

One of the fundamental characteristics of today's world, as speakers noted at the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "is the more important role of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America that have freed themselves from colonial and semicolonial dependence."<sup>1</sup>

The change in the place and role of the Latin American countries in world economics and politics is connected with the growth of their economic potential, the removal of pro-imperialist oligarchies from positions of power in a number of countries, the stronger tendency toward national independence and the establishment of international ties, free of imperialist control, with the socialist world, the developing states of Asia and Africa and the movement for nonalignment. The further development of revolutionary processes in the region is attested to by the consolidation of Cuban and Nicaraguan influence, the increasing strength of national patriotic forces in Guyana and Surinam, the upsurge in the liberation struggle in Central America and the exacerbation of the crisis of rightwing authoritarian regimes in South America. All of

this is objectively contracting U.S. imperialism's sphere of influence in Latin America and is evoking an extremely unhealthy response from Washington, which has long, ever since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, regarded the entire Western Hemisphere as its home front.

One feature distinguishing the Reagan Administration's Latin American policy from the policy of previous administrations is the tendency to view and assess old and new problems in U.S. relations with its southern neighbors and all new developments in these countries primarily, if not exclusively, from the standpoint of the American strategy of global confrontation with the USSR and the socialist world in general. This is the foundation of the functioning of all links of the U.S. propaganda machine, which is conducting ideological warfare against neighboring states, and of military policy decisions with regard to the most complex and urgent situations, especially crisis, in the region.

The intensification of U.S. expansionism and the Reagan Administration's alliance with military dictatorships in Central America and the governments of a number of island mini-states, which the White House has been able to involve in the implementation of its plans in the Caribbean, are being camouflaged with a propaganda campaign of unprecedented intensity about the "Soviet-Cuban threat." The U.S. President and his closest advisers are constantly leveling groundless accusations at the USSR, Cuba and Nicaragua, alleging that they want to establish their own hegemony in the Caribbean, that they are building up their military strength here and that they are financing and supporting the "subversive activity" of the national freedom fighters Washington has labeled "international terrorists."<sup>2</sup> Employing the postulates of the notorious "domino theory," members of the Republican administration are describing the near future in the style of a horror film, in which the "subversive activity" in Central America will first move to Mexico and the Panama Canal and then to all of South America.<sup>3</sup>

The myths about the "Soviet threat" and the "communist conspiracy" are being used to validate Washington's heightened imperious ambitions in Latin America, to justify its interventionist line in relations with its southern neighbors and to prove the "right" of the United States to dominate countries of the region and to interfere in their internal affairs.

The Reagan Administration has not concealed its main goal--the prevention of the "further spread of communism" (this is what people in Washington call the development of revolutionary processes) in the Western Hemisphere with the aid of military power and economic strength. It believes that this is the only way for the United States to re-establish its leadership in this part of the world and regain the lost trust of its "friends." Washington is trying to keep the countries of the region within its sphere of influence, secure unlimited access to their strategic and other raw materials and expand possibilities for the exploitation of Latin America by American monopolies.

Although Reagan's Latin American policy is a revival of the "big stick" and "gunboat diplomacy" policy, it differs from the old one because it has been re-engendered in a fundamentally new atmosphere, in which regional interventionist behavior could put the world on the verge of thermonuclear catastrophe,

as in the case of the 1962 Caribbean crisis. The policy of interventionism with which Washington has armed itself poses a serious threat to the vital interests of the Latin American people, is escalating tension in "hot spots" and is creating new conflict situations and seats of military danger.

The aggressive aims of the Reagan Administration's Latin American policy were clearly apparent during the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in April-June 1982.<sup>4</sup> The United States actually joined England in its war against Argentina, openly ignoring the decision of an emergency meeting of the OAS foreign ministers. A resolution passed at this meeting in May 1982 vehemently condemned England's aggression and the United States' behavior. Washington provided the Thatcher government with a reliable home front and facilitated the military seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. At the same time, it took every opportunity to prevent the solidarity of the Latin American people and many of their governments with Argentina from acquiring a more active and effective nature.

There is every reason to believe that Washington made this decision primarily and mainly with a view to the fact that England is of much greater value in U.S. imperialism's strategy of confrontation with the USSR than Argentina or Latin America in general, particularly in connection with the unconditional willingness of the Conservatives to allow the continued use of English territory for American missiles aimed at the USSR. Besides this, the coordination of the military, political and economic actions of all imperialist powers, headed by the United States, during the Falkland crisis was supposed to teach a "forcible lesson" and to intimidate more than just Argentina. This was pointed out by F. Castro in his message to the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries in May 1982. He noted that imperialism was striving to turn the war it had unleashed in the South Atlantic into a lesson "for all of the Third World countries which--regardless of their political and social order--are defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity."<sup>5</sup>

England's military victory over Argentina did not remove the Falkland problem from the agenda of international and inter-American relations. The Latin American countries are still making statements in the United Nations and OAS to demand the restoration of Argentina's legal rights, disregarded by England, to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. In this way, this problem has become a permanent factor intensifying the confrontation between the United States and most of the states of the region where anxiety has been aroused by the intensive conversion of the Falkland (Malvinas) archipelago into a large NATO military base.

The United States' pirate raid on Grenada in October 1983 with the assistance of a number of East Caribbean island mini-states, which had turned to Washington with an obviously prompted request for an invasion of the island, became a new stage in the escalation of the Reagan Administration's extremely dangerous militarist line in the Caribbean.

By undertaking the intervention against Grenada in October 1983, the Reagan Administration wanted to get rid of a government objectionable to the United States and, with the same blow, to accomplish several tasks connected with the implementation of its own "Caribbean strategy," namely:

To demonstrate the U.S. administration's willingness to openly use American armed forces to stifle liberation movements and overthrow "Marxist regimes" in the Caribbean;

To support undemocratic dictatorships in the region, assuring them that the Reagan Administration would "not leave" Central America under any circumstances and would not leave them to the mercy of fate, as once was the case in South Vietnam;

To evoke an outburst of chauvinistic frenzy among certain strata of the U.S. population and thereby strengthen Ronald Reagan's chances in the race for the presidency.

With its blatant aggression against Grenada, Washington hoped to intimidate the freedom-loving people of the Caribbean, but it put itself in the pillory: 108 UN members, including many U.S. allies, voted in favor of a resolution describing the invasion of Grenada by American troops as a flagrant violation of international law and an infringement of this country's independence. They demanded the immediate cessation of the intervention and the unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from the island.

The reaction in Latin America was particularly emotional. The occupation of Grenada proved that any Latin American country could become the victim of American imperialism's armed intervention if its government's policy should be objectionable to the White House. Nothing of this nature had occurred in inter-American relations in the past two decades.

One of the most important lessons of the Grenada tragedy and of the Falkland crisis was the realization by people in the region that the interests of U.S. imperialism and Latin America were radically opposed and that the time had come for a more active joint struggle against mounting U.S. aggression and for peace and international security in an alliance with all peace-loving forces. Only this can secure the just and peaceful settlement of conflicts in the region. Another lesson of the Grenada events was the realization that the unity of revolutionary, patriotic forces on the national level and the close interaction and unification of all Latin American countries are more important in today's tense international situation than ever before.

Although the Washington "hawks" have praised the piratical U.S. aggression against Grenada to the utmost, they cannot conceal the fact that the White House suffered a serious moral and political defeat.

## 2. Reagan's "Caribbean Strategy"

The White House's reliance on military strength and authoritarianism in the resolution of problems in relations with its southern neighbors has set the basic parameters of Reagan's so-called "Caribbean strategy," which has been assigned a particularly important place in Washington's Latin American policy. More than 90 percent of all the funds allocated to Latin America in U.S. economic and military assistance programs are sent to the Caribbean countries. This is also attested to by the higher level of U.S. military and political activity in the region. For example, two of President Reagan's foreign trips

before 1983 were made mainly for the purpose of visiting a number of Caribbean countries for summit-level talks. The U.S. secretary of state also made a special trip to the countries of this region.

In addition to building up American mobile military strength, the Pentagon has continued to reinforce the Caribbean command (the Latin American version of the "rapid deployment force"), set up by the Carter Administration in Key West (Florida), less than 150 kilometers from Cuba, and headed by Admiral R. McKenzie. Large-scale Pentagon and NATO maneuvers are held almost continuously in the region, the Second American Fleet is being reinforced, military bases in Puerto Rico and the former Panama Canal Zone are being modernized, and steps are being taken to establish new military bases on the island of Amapala in the Gulf of Fonseca, on the island of Tortue and on the territory of Honduras. So-called "patrol operations" are regularly conducted near the shores of Cuba and other Central American countries, and during these operations the sovereign rights of these states are flagrantly violated.

Socialist Cuba, revolutionary Nicaragua and the liberation and democratic forces in El Salvador and other countries of the region are the target of this Caribbean strategy.

The Reagan Administration has intensified the struggle against Cuba that has been going on for a quarter of a century now: It has reinforced the economic blockade, prohibited all contacts and travel by Americans in this country, is intensifying its campaign of blackmail and threats and is constantly rattling its saber. Ronald Reagan called socialist Cuba the "center of evil" in the Western Hemisphere, just as he called the USSR the "center of evil" in the world. The most irresponsible politicians in Washington are threatening to organize a "national liberation war against the Castro regime," viewing the annual "Ocean Venture" maneuvers and other shows of military strength near the shores of Cuba as rehearsals for this war. In 1982 the U.S. Senate adopted the so-called Symms Amendment (named after the senator from Idaho), which actually blessed the Reagan Administration's intention to use force at an opportune moment against socialist Cuba on the pretext of counteracting the "Cuban threat" in the Western Hemisphere. Since 1982 a persistent campaign has been going on in Washington corridors of power to hang the tag of obsolescence on the 1962 U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba and not to support the interventionist ventures of Cuban emigres. In September 1983 the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Congress held closed hearings on this matter at the insistence of Senator J. Helms, who declared that the specter of pledges made by President Kennedy should not tie the United States' hands.<sup>6</sup> In October 1983 the United States allocated funds for a subversive radio station with the blasphemous name of "Radio Marti" for more intensive psychological diversionary actions against Cuba.

The Cuban people have responded to the aggressive U.S. intrigues by rallying round the party and government and by displaying tenacity and vigilance. The Cuban Government had to take additional measures to strengthen the country's defense capabilities when the danger of war grew stronger. In 1984, for example, 500,000 more people are to be added to the people's volunteer corps uniting more than half a million men and women who are fully determined to defend their socialist homeland.



The socialist states, the nonaligned movement and the international public have taken the side of the heroic people of the island of freedom in this complex and tense atmosphere. The USSR's invariable solidarity with the Cuban people was reaffirmed in February 1984 when General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K. U. Chernenko met with First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Fidel Castro Ruz.<sup>7</sup> When K. U. Chernenko addressed the voters, he declared that the hope of intimidating Cuba and of "diverting it from its chosen path is destined to fail. This is guaranteed by the unshakeable will of the heroic Cuban people, united around their Communist Party. It is guaranteed by the solidarity of independent Latin American states and many members of the movement for nonalignment with the island of freedom. Fraternal socialist states are giving the Cuban people resolute support. As for the USSR, it has always taken Cuba's side, and it always will, in fair and foul weather."<sup>8</sup>

The most important source of tension in the region was created by the escalation of Washington's subversive activity against revolutionary Nicaragua, which took on the nature of an undeclared war. Systematic invasions of Nicaraguan territory by large Somozist gangs, robbing and murdering civilians, began in spring 1983. Their training and arming have been conducted by the American CIA in special camps (according to various estimates, from 6,000 to 8,000 Somozist mercenaries are concentrated here)<sup>9</sup> on the territory of neighboring Central American states, mainly Honduras, which the White House is trying to turn into a "Central American Israel"--a strategic U.S. ally in the struggle against national liberation forces in Central America. An eastern base was established in Costa Rica in addition to the main western base of the Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries in Honduras in order to force Nicaragua to fight on two fronts. Nicaragua has been subjected to surprise air and sea attacks with increasing frequency.

The conspiracy against Nicaragua took on even more sinister scales when the Pentagon concentrated a force of 19 warships near the Nicaraguan coastline and transferred around 5,000 American servicemen to Honduras during the American-Honduran joint "Big Pine-2" maneuvers that lasted for more than 6 months. After the maneuvers ended in February 1984, 1,700 U.S. servicemen stayed in Honduras by "mutual consent" for the new "Grenadero-1" and "Big Pine-3" maneuvers.

Therefore, the U.S. military presence in Honduras, in regions adjacent to the Nicaraguan border, is acquiring a permanent nature. Its purpose is the stronger support and arming of the Somozist gangs that have been resolutely repulsed by Nicaraguan armed forces and the entire population, as well as the further escalation of tension in this region.

One aspect of the U.S. undeclared war on Nicaragua consists in the mining of ports and maritime approaches to the republic, conducted with the aid of the United States and the direct participation of agencies and individuals under its control. More than 10 foreign vessels have suffered as a result of these provocative actions, designed to block Nicaragua from the sea. They included the Soviet tanker "Lugansk," which was blown up by a mine when it approached the port of Sandino.

The USSR Government addressed a resolute protest to the U.S. Government in connection with this criminal act against a Soviet ship. The Soviet Government's note of 21 March 1984 describes the actions against foreign ships on commercial runs to Nicaragua and areas close to its shores as evidence of a policy of governmental terrorism.

Washington's aggressive behavior is escalating tension in Central America, it is a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter and it is viewed as a challenge by the entire world public.

The Sandinist national liberation front and the Nicaraguan Government realize that their country is in serious danger and are doing everything within their power to frustrate American imperialism's interventionist plans. Under the cover of the doctrine of a struggle against "international terrorism," the Reagan Administration has considerably expanded the Carter Administration's intervention in the Salvadoran drama. Ronald Reagan has called El Salvador a battlefield against "international communism" and a touchstone of East-West relations and has accused Cuba and Nicaragua of supporting Salvadoran rebels. This was the tone of the first and second "white papers" on the situation in El Salvador and Central America, fabricated by the CIA and published by the State Department in 1981 and 1983 respectively. Few people--even in the United States, not to mention Western Europe and Latin America--believed these lies, which were based on the testimony of paid agents of the U.S. special services and photocopies of forged documents.<sup>10</sup>

To save the undemocratic regime in El Salvador, the White House increased its economic and military assistance tenfold, augmented its shipments of helicopters and other weapons, sent "Green Beret" subunits and its own military advisers to take control of the Salvadoran army and punitive forces, is drawing up plans for combat operations against partisan forces and is taking a direct part in their implementation. The Salvadoran regime is the main recipient of U.S. military assistance in the region. In fiscal year 1984 this aid was 40 million dollars greater than in 1983 and totaled 205 million dollars.<sup>11</sup> Economic aid through all channels annually exceeds 500 million dollars.<sup>12</sup> With Washington's encouragement, the reactionary regimes of neighboring Honduras and Guatemala are interfering more and more in the Salvadoran drama.

Limited social reforms and elections were announced at the same time to create a "democratic facade" for the ruling Salvadoran regime and to make it easier for Reagan to push a Salvadoran aid program through the Congress.

The escalation of U.S. intervention and the political maneuvers connected with the "Salvadoran elections" only exacerbated the situation in El Salvador and intensified the struggle in this country because the Reagan Administration and the local military establishment are concerned primarily with the destruction of the rebel army. Bloody reprisals against the civilian population have been intensified.

The hopes of the Reagan Administration and local fascist reactionary forces for a quick military victory in this Central American country were frustrated,

however, by the heroic struggle of the popular masses under the leadership of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). Patriotic forces have continued their armed struggle and are simultaneously demanding a political solution to the Salvadoran crisis. The FMLN and FDR have resolutely demanded the cessation of U.S. intervention in Salvadoran internal affairs. All progressive people support the just fight of the Salvadoran patriots.

In this way, the White House's "Caribbean strategy" has posed a serious threat to the vital interests of the people of these countries and has created seats of tension endangering world peace.

The Reagan Administration's "Caribbean strategy" also has the aim of updating capitalist structures and strengthening the position of military dictatorships and reactionary regimes in this subregion to prevent new revolutionary upheavals here. A 1982 U.S. National Security Council document on "American policy in Central America and Cuba Through 1984" said: "Over the long range we must establish politically stable governments capable of resisting the Soviet-Cuban influence."<sup>13</sup>

In this way American imperialism is trying to protect primarily its own strategic interests, although American monopolies have recently concentrated larger capital investments in this region. The foreign economic relations of countries in the region are geared primarily to the United States and other imperialist centers, and these are also their principal creditors.

The main instrument of this strategy is the "development assistance program" for Central America and the Caribbean, something like a "mini-Marshall Plan" announced by President Reagan in February 1982 in his statement about the so-called Caribbean initiative in OAS headquarters in Washington.<sup>14</sup> At the end of 1982 the U.S. Congress allocated the 350 million dollars requested by the administration as emergency aid for the Caribbean countries to cover their balance of payment deficits, and in July 1983 it passed a law on the "economic restoration of the Caribbean," which went into effect after it had been signed by Ronald Reagan on 5 August 1983.<sup>15</sup> It was announced at this time that the future financing of long-range projects within the "Caribbean initiative" framework would be covered by the general program of economic aid to foreign states approved annually by the U.S. Congress. With the addition of these allocations, U.S. economic aid to Central America and the Caribbean through all channels reached 787 million dollars in 1984, or more than double the 1980 figure of 324 million dollars.

Although the White House advertised the "mini-Marshall Plan" as a cure for all economic disorders and an effective way of stimulating development, the American assistance is inadequate even for the satisfaction of the minimum regional demand for external financing. According to expert estimates, the countries of Central America and the Caribbean need emergency economic aid of 2-4 billion dollars a year to overcome their current severe socioeconomic crisis.<sup>16</sup> Besides this, American aid is extended on extremely rigid terms and only after each country included in the "Caribbean initiative" has signed an administrative bilateral agreement with the United States on fiscal matters and has concluded another agreement to secure American capital investments.

Military aid to these countries is growing even more quickly. Between 1980 and 1983 it increased from 14 million dollars to 190 million.<sup>17</sup>

The second component of the "Caribbean initiative"--duty-free trade with the Caribbean countries--covered, with White House authorization, by the "mini-Marshall Plan," was put in effect by a presidential decision at the beginning of 1984.<sup>18</sup> Besides this, the Republican Administration announced its intention to offer guarantees and privileges to American transnational corporations investing capital in the economies of the Caribbean countries, regarding them, in accordance with the postulates of "Reaganomics," as the main generator of capitalist modernization and development.

An analysis of the distribution of U.S. economic and military assistance offered, in President Reagan's words, to "friends or future friends" reveals the priorities of the "Caribbean strategy." In addition to El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, the other main recipients of Washington's gifts are Jamaica, which the Reagan Administration is trying to turn into an exhibit of the "achievements" of free enterprise, and Costa Rica and the East Caribbean countries, which Washington wants to involve in its own interventionist plans.

Recent events have confirmed that the main purpose of the "mini-Marshall Plan" is the establishment of an economic foundation for a new military-political bloc of reactionary governments in Central America and the East Caribbean, which is being persistently engineered by the Reagan Administration. When U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz traveled to Latin America and the Caribbean in February 1984, he visited Barbados, where he negotiated U.S. contributions to the reinforcement of regional forces for the security and defense of the East Caribbean countries.<sup>19</sup> Washington is also trying to reinforce the Central American Defense Council, which ceased to function after the fall of Dictator Somoza.

### 3. The Reagan Administration's "Peace-Making" Maneuvers

In late 1982 and early 1983 the Reagan Administration launched a loud campaign designed to demonstrate the U.S. "peace-loving" approach to Caribbean problems. This was a largely forced maneuver.

By this time the hope of a quick and easy military victory in El Salvador had disappeared. Washington's plans to force Nicaragua and Cuba to "change their behavior" by dramatically intensifying economic and military pressure on them in 1982 turned out to be futile. It also became evident that the majority of Western U.S. allies had dissociated themselves from Washington's "anticommunist crusade" in the Caribbean. The U.S. administration could not win the support of the absolute majority of Latin American countries; its militarist line was also condemned by the nonaligned movement. Such influential international forces as the Socialist International and the Vatican also took an extremely negative view of it.

Criticism of the "Caribbean strategy" became stronger in the United States. Some Americans, particularly liberal circles, intellectuals, students, Catholic and pacifist organizations and many members of the Democratic Party, are

worried that the situation in Central America could go out of control and that the Reagan Administration could involve the United States in a war, the negative implications of which would be compounded by the geographic proximity of the seat of the conflict to the United States. They describe Reagan's interventionist line as a way of "getting bogged down in the Caribbean swamp."<sup>20</sup>

These worries have begun to spread to Capitol Hill. In 1983 the Congress made several cuts in allocations requested by the U.S. President for the implementation of his "Caribbean strategy." The outburst of chauvinistic feelings among members of the establishment and average citizens in connection with the "victory" of American arms in Grenada muffled opposition temporarily, but could not eradicate it. Ronald Reagan's policy in this explosive region once again became the subject of heated debates after the start of the presidential campaign in the United States.

Public statements on Latin American policy and the "Caribbean strategy" by the U.S. President and his advisers now contain assurances of the United States' "love of peace" in addition to belligerent declarations and threats. Addressing a joint session of both congressional houses, Reagan said, for example, that the United States "will focus on the political settlement of Central American problems."<sup>21</sup>

In 1983 the President appointed L. Motley to serve as assistant secretary of inter-American affairs instead of T. Enders, who had been accused by Reagan's closest advisers of not being firm enough and "letting the region entrusted to him slip out of his hands."<sup>22</sup> Millionaire R. Stone (a lawyer by education) was given a special ambassadorial mission to negotiate with the Central American countries. In February 1984, however, he suffered the same fate as Enders. Stone "could not cope with the region" either. After this, in August 1983, a bipartisan commission was set up by a presidential decision. The commission of 12, headed by former Secretary of State H. Kissinger, was supposed to make recommendations regarding "long-range U.S. policy in the region." After spending a week touring five Central American countries and visiting Panama, the commission submitted its report on the situation in Central America to Reagan in January 1984, expressing support for the Republican administration's interventionist line and recommending the continued buildup of U.S. military strength in the region to repulse "internal and external threats to its security and stability," the augmentation of economic aid to pro-American regimes to 8 billion dollars for the 5-year period beginning in 1985 and certain additional measures to establish "democratic institutions" here.<sup>23</sup>

It is indicative that a public commission was set up in opposition to the official one. The so-called anti-Kissinger commission consisted of researchers and former statesmen. They proposed their alternative to the decisions of the Kissinger commission, advising the cessation of military aid to El Salvador and other pro-American regimes and to the anti-Sandinist forces sent to Nicaragua, and advocating the normalization of relations with Cuba.<sup>24</sup>

The "peaceful" U.S. offensive, judging by many indications, is something like a Reagan "zero option" for the Caribbean. Its aim is not confined to the

pacification of critics within the United States, allowing Reagan to appear before the voters dressed in the toga of a peacemaker and creating a more appealing image for Reagan's "Caribbean strategy" abroad. The main thing is that the White House is trying to use diplomatic methods to achieve what it could not gain by militarist methods. The talks conducted by L. Motley, H. Kissinger, R. Stone and his successor G. Schlaudeman proved that the Reagan Administration was intensifying aggressive action in the Caribbean to impose a Camp-David variety of peacekeeping on the people of the region by turning Honduras into the "Central American Israel." It was no coincidence that the "peace-making maneuvers" served as a cover for the preparations for the U.S. intervention in Grenada. Besides this, they were designed to neutralize the constructive peaceful initiatives of many Latin American countries disturbed by the increased tension and military danger in Caribbean "hot spots."

Several Caribbean states proposed that this region be declared a "zone of peace," and this won broad international support. The "Contadora Group" (made up of representatives of Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Panama) became active at the beginning of 1983. When the foreign ministers of these states met on the Panamanian island of Contadora in January 1983, they rejected Washington's interpretation of events in the region and advised more active Latin American dialogue on all problems connected with the security and stability of this part of the world.<sup>25</sup>

The Contadora Group held several additional conferences throughout 1983, sometimes with the participation of representatives of other Central American countries. The result of this intensive diplomatic activity was a plan for a peaceful settlement in the Caribbean. Its basic provisions were approved by the presidents of the Contadora Group states at a meeting in Cancun (Mexico) in July 1983. Their "Cancun Declaration" was addressed to the governments of the Central American countries, the United States and Cuba. This declaration later served as the basis for detailed proposals in a policy-planning document consisting of 20 points. It was distributed to all of the parties concerned, was submitted to the UN secretary-general and was made public at a session of the UN General Assembly on 8 October 1983.

The Contadora Group's main proposals are aimed at the conclusion of a regional agreement (or several agreements) and the institution of specific measures under international control to guarantee the establishment of peace, security and stability in the region. These measures include the curtailment of weapon shipments, the recall of all military advisers, the dismantling of foreign military bases, the cessation of combat maneuvers, the reduction of arms and the renunciation of subversive activity. Other proposals pertained to the guarantee of human rights, the promotion of national accord and the establishment of democratic representative systems based on the principles of pluralism. Besides this, cooperation for the purpose of socioeconomic development is envisaged.

Although the Contadora Group's peaceful initiative bears the distinct imprint of bourgeois reformism, Cuba and Nicaragua welcomed the efforts to eliminate dangerous seats of tension. In his reply to the presidents of the Contadora

countries, F. Castro said that Cuba is in favor of agreements to secure peace in the region. The Nicaraguan Government responded by expressing its willingness to enter into multilateral negotiations under the auspices of this group. It also put forth its own peace initiatives, proposing draft agreements between the United States, Nicaragua and other Central American countries whose governments agree in principle with the policy-planning document. The states of Latin America, Western Europe and Japan supported the efforts of the Contadora Group.

When the members of the group met with representatives of five Central American countries in Panama in January 1984, they approved a document stipulating the procedure for the implementation of the plan.

Under the conditions of this extensive international support for the Contadora Group's peaceful initiative, the White House had to verbally express agreement with it. In fact, however, the Reagan Administration has stubbornly refused to take any specific actions in this area.

#### 4. The Exacerbation of Conflicts

Conflicts dividing the United States from its southern neighbors are now most clearly apparent in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. But this is not the only "sore spot" in inter-American relations. Mexico's DIA newspaper remarked on 26 August 1983 that the Reagan Administration's behavior had "led to the perceptible deterioration of inter-American relations and the apparent isolation of U.S. policy in Latin America."

Now that the Reagan Administration has resolved to strengthen ties with the "big three" (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) and the "second echelon" countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador), it is avoiding the frequent use of power tactics. Washington is trying to gain the support of these Latin American countries for its "fundamental aims" by taking advantage of such vulnerable spots and weaknesses of its neighbors as their strong economic dependence on transnational corporations, their interest in the U.S. market and in foreign loans, their lack of steady concerted action in international affairs, their inclination to make compromises with imperialism and the anti-communist views of many members of ruling bourgeois groups.

This policy of "building bridges" has not produced significant results, however, because many old conflicts still exist and new ones are being accumulated in the sphere of economic and political interrelations, engendered by the White House's attempts to impose the recipes of "Reaganomics" on its southern neighbors favoring the establishment of a new international economic order.

The foreign indebtedness of the Latin American countries, which has reached critical dimensions (336 billion dollars at the end of 1983), is becoming increasingly prominent among these conflicts. Interest and principal payments are already beyond the actual capabilities of these countries.<sup>26</sup> Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela are among the five largest debtors in the developing world. These and many other countries in the region have constantly

been on the verge of financial bankruptcy in recent years. The United States, as the main creditor in the capitalist world, and other imperialist powers are afraid to allow these large debtors to declare bankruptcy because this would unavoidably cause a chain reaction and would shake the entire capitalist currency system to its foundations. This is why the question of deferred payments and revised terms for the repayment of foreign debts has already become a pressing political issue in U.S. interrelations with its southern neighbors.

The Reagan Administration would like to agree on terms for the consolidation of foreign debts separately with each debtor, which would give it a completely free hand and the possibility of taking authoritarian action depending on the behavior of each specific debtor. The majority of Latin American countries feel that the United States should conclude an agreement with all of the states in the region, acting in concert; this will heighten their ability to resist U.S. pressure. Their position was set forth in the "Quito Declaration," adopted by high-placed representatives of countries of the region at the Latin American Economic Conference in the capital of Ecuador in January 1984. In this document the conference participants quite seriously warned creditor nations and international financial organizations that the latter must share the responsibility for the resolution of foreign indebtedness problems in the developing countries. This will only be possible if settlement terms are "flexible, realistic and compatible with economic revitalization."<sup>27</sup> The struggle over these matters is growing increasingly heated.

A new group of conflicts between the United States and its southern neighbors, connected with the Reagan Administration's obstruction of the international convention on the law of the sea, also warrants attention. The Latin American countries were among the initiators of the draft convention, although not all of them have signed it as yet. The claims of the U.S. Government and American monopolies to the uncontrolled use of world ocean resources will unavoidably injure the interests of Latin American states and other countries.

The Reagan Administration cannot take any credit for substantially improved relations with the main Latin American countries. In fact, in many cases the distance between their foreign policy and Washington's policy line has increased, and this was graphically demonstrated at the latest session of the OAS General Assembly in November 1983. Such events on the continent of South America as the victory of popular democratic forces in Bolivia and the severe crisis of rightwing authoritarian regimes testify that the Reagan Administration is incapable of controlling the course of events on its "home front." The people of Latin America have no desire to agree to imperialism's authoritarian demands.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, 14-15 June 1983," Moscow, 1983, p 23.
2. The U.S. State Department published a special report in August 1982 to reinforce these allegations ("Cuban Armed Forces and Soviet Military



Presence," United States Department of State, Special Report, No 103, Wash., August 1982).

3. See the policy statement Reagan made in the U.S. Congress in April 1983 (THE WASHINGTON POST, 28 April 1983) and the statements made by G. Shultz during his tour of the Caribbean and South America in February 1984.
4. Also see K. N. Brutents, "The Conflict in the South Atlantic: Some Implications and Lessons," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 11--Editor's note.
5. GRANMA, 11 May 1982.
6. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 13 August 1982; THE WASHINGTON POST, 24 September 1983.
7. PRAVDA, 16 February 1984.
8. Ibid., 3 March 1984.
9. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 11 October 1983.
10. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 8 June 1981; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 28-29 May 1983.
11. AVANCES DE INVESTIGACION (Centro de estudios sobre America, Havana), February 1983, No 18, p 59.
12. L. Maira, "America Latina y la crisis de hegemonia norteamericana," Lima, 1982, p 286.
13. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 April 1983.
14. Ibid., 25 February 1982.
15. CBI, "Como entender la iniciativa de la Cuenca del Caribe," No 1, 1983, p 9.
16. AVANCES DE INVESTIGACION, April 1982, No 13, p 45.
17. "Bilateral Assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean, FY 1984," United States Department of State, Wash., March 1983; CURRENT POLICY, No 467; AVANCES DE INVESTIGACION, February 1983, No 18, p 53.
18. This applies to all of the countries in the region, with the exception of Cuba and Nicaragua, and France's Overseas Departments. The conditions of duty-free trade do not extend to a number of commodities: textiles, footwear, leather apparel, petroleum products and others.
19. Yu. V. Romantsov, "Tough Policy in 'Soft Packing,'" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 3.

20. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1982, p 1088.
21. THE WASHINGTON POST, 28 April 1983.
22. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 May 1983.
23. "Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," Wash., January 1984, pp 53, 101-102, 127.
24. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 25 January 1984.
25. EL NACIONAL CARACAS, 10 January 1983.
26. FINANCIAL TIMES, 26 March 1984.
27. GRANMA, 14 January 1984.

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## STALIN'S ROLE IN WORLD WAR II SECOND FRONT CONTROVERSY STRESSED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 24 May 84) pp 38-51

[Article by O. A. Rzheshhevskiy: "The Problem of the Second Front and Its Resolution (On the 40th Anniversary of Operation 'Overlord')"]

[Text] Early in the morning of 6 June 1944 the armed forces of the Western allies began operation "Overlord"--the landing of their troops in northern France, on the coast of Normandy.<sup>1</sup> "The landing of American and English expeditionary forces in Normandy, signifying the opening of the second front in Western Europe," Soviet researchers point out, "was the largest strategic amphibious operation of World War II."<sup>2</sup>

The question of a second front was first officially raised in a personal message from the head of the Soviet Government to the prime minister of Great Britain on 18 July 1941. Applauding the establishment of ally relations between the USSR and Great Britain<sup>3</sup> and expressing the certainty that the two states would be strong enough to defeat their common enemy, I. V. Stalin wrote: "It also seems to me that the military position of the Soviet Union and of Great Britain would be improved considerably if a front were to be established against Hitler in the west (in northern France) and in the north (in the Arctic). The front in the north of France would not only draw Hitler's forces away from the east but would also make Hitler's invasion of England impossible."<sup>4</sup> Churchill rejected the Soviet proposal on the grounds of insufficient strength and the danger that a landing operation would be a "bloody failure."<sup>5</sup>

In September 1941 the head of the Soviet Government again raised the question of a joint struggle against Hitler's forces in connection with the serious complication of the USSR's military position. In his letters of 3 and 13 September 1941 he told Churchill that Germany had transferred more than 30 new infantry divisions and many tanks and airplanes to the eastern front and had instituted more active operations by 46 divisions of its allies. As a result, the Soviet Union had lost more than half of the Ukraine and the enemy was at the gates of Leningrad. "The Germans consider the danger from the west to be a bluff," a letter said, "and are fearlessly transferring all of their western forces to the east in the certainty that there is no second front in the west and there never will be. The Germans feel quite confident of their ability to beat their opponents one by one: first the Russians and then the English."<sup>6</sup>

Churchill acknowledged that the Soviet Union was shouldering the entire burden of the struggle against fascist inroads and that the Hitlerites expected to eliminate their opponents one by one, but he nevertheless repeated his arguments about the "impossibility" of opening a second front.<sup>7</sup>

It is significant that at that time this would have meant only operations of limited scale against Germany on the European continent. These operations were possible and would have been a real help to the USSR. "The Russian resistance," Lord Beaverbrook, an influential member of the war cabinet and the minister of the aviation industry, reported to the cabinet at that time, "provides us with new opportunities.... It has created an almost revolutionary situation in all occupied countries and has opened up 2,000 miles of coastline for a landing by English troops. But the Germans can transfer their divisions to the east with impunity precisely because our generals still view the continent as a forbidden zone for English troops."<sup>8</sup> Soviet researchers correctly noted the objectivity of this statement by a prominent member of the English government who was well aware of the military situation and of Great Britain's capabilities.<sup>9</sup>

Military and political events of major importance took place in December 1941. The Soviet Armed Forces took the counteroffensive and defeated German fascist troops near Moscow. The victory in the battle for Moscow marked the failure of Hitler's plan for a "blitzkrieg" against the USSR and led to radical changes in the war against fascism by proving the inevitability of the aggressors' defeat to all freedom-loving people.

The United States entered the war. As a result of a surprise attack by Japanese airborne forces on Pearl Harbor, the main U.S. naval base in the Pacific, and of subsequent Japanese sea and air raids on British Malaya, Indochina, Thailand, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong and the Philippines, the strategic positions of the United States and Great Britain were undermined. By spring 1942 Japanese military strength dominated the Pacific and Southeast Asia. When General D. MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East, addressed American troops not long before their surrender in the Philippines, he said that "the hopes of the civilized world are now indissolubly connected with the actions of the heroic Red Army and its valiant banners."<sup>10</sup>

It was at this time that U.S. military circles began drafting a strategic plan based on the essential need to concentrate U.S. potential for a strike against Germany and envisaging the concentration of forces and equipment in England for an invasion in northern France. The plan was discussed at a White House conference on 1 April 1942 and was approved by Roosevelt, who attached great political significance to it, particularly with regard to the USSR. He felt that the Soviet ally should be given some assurances about the second front. When the President and his advisers approved the plan, one of their most important considerations was the view of the USSR as a powerful military ally for the defeat of Germany and then of Japan. General D. Dean, the head of the American military mission in Moscow in 1943-1945, wrote that "the President and the chiefs of staff attached the greatest importance to Soviet participation in the war in the Pacific almost from the beginning of Japan's attack on the United States to the final defeat of Japan."<sup>11</sup>

Roosevelt decided to send H. Hopkins, his special adviser, and General G. Marshall, the U.S. army chief of staff, to London to report the U.S. plans. Hopkins and Marshall obtained the English government's consent in principle to the opening of a second front in 1943 (operation "Roundup") and the landing of a limited force of Western allies in 1942 (operation "Sledgehammer"). On 11 April Roosevelt invited USSR embassy counsel A. A. Gromyko to the White House and gave him a personal message for the head of the Soviet Government. Roosevelt proposed that a Soviet delegation, headed by the people's commissar of foreign affairs, be sent to Washington to negotiate the opening of the second front. On 20 April I. V. Stalin replied that the Soviet Government would consent to a meeting between the U.S. President and the USSR commissar of foreign affairs and a military representative to discuss the organization of a second front in Europe without delay. The letter said that Soviet representatives would also go to London to discuss the matter with the English government.<sup>12</sup>

The decision to establish a second front was made as a result of V. M. Molotov's difficult and intense negotiations with Churchill and Roosevelt and with U.S. and British generals and other officials. Joint official communiques (Soviet-American and Soviet-English) said that "total agreement had been reached on the urgent need for a second front in Europe in 1942."<sup>13</sup>

People in the Soviet Union realized that the allies would have to overcome many obstacles before the second front could be opened in 1942, but the defeat of German fascist troops near Moscow and the concentration of the main forces of Hitler's Germany and its allies on the Soviet-German front established the prerequisites for a successful strategic attack on the fascist reich from the west. The Soviet Union had every right to expect Great Britain and the United States, whose armed forces then numbered around 10 million, to launch combat operations in Europe and thereby draw part of the fascist army away from the Soviet-German front. This could have been a great help to the Soviet Union and could have led to the quicker defeat of the fascist bloc, shortened the war and reduced the number of its victims.

Nevertheless, the second front was not opened in 1942 or in 1943.

In the second half of June 1942, during Churchill's talks with Roosevelt<sup>14</sup> behind the USSR's back, the refusal to open a second front and its "replacement" with a landing of Anglo-American troops in North Africa (operation "Torch") were essentially predetermined. In July 1942 the governments of England and the United States refused to open a second front in 1942 in spite of the pledges recorded in the Soviet-English and Soviet-American communiques. Furthermore, the decision to conduct an operation in North Africa virtually excluded the possibility of a second front in Europe in 1943.<sup>15</sup> General D. Eisenhower (then U.S. Army deputy chief of staff), one of the people who took an active part in drafting the plan, wrote that "any operation in the Mediterranean in 1942 would almost certainly exclude the possibility of a major offensive across the English Channel in 1943."<sup>16</sup>

The only remaining question concerned the best method of canceling the promises made to the Soviet Union about the opening of a second front in 1942. It was agreed that Churchill himself would go to Moscow and explain this to the Soviet Government. In August 1942 Churchill arrived in Moscow for negotiations.

A. Harriman was present at the talks as the personal representative of the U.S. President in order to demonstrate the common views of England and the United States on political and military matters.<sup>17</sup>

During a conversation on 13 August 1942, I. V. Stalin gave Churchill and Harriman a memorandum noting that the year of 1942 offered "the best possible conditions for the establishment of a second front in Europe, as almost all of Germany's forces, and its best troops at that, had been sent to the eastern front."<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, Churchill declared that England and the United States would not open a second front in Europe in 1942 and promised only to conduct operation "Torch." At the same time, he assured Stalin that a broad-scale invasion on the European continent would take place in spring 1943. Harriman gave Churchill his total support.

People in the Soviet Union were well aware of the actual aims of England and the United States and could not be satisfied with the results of Churchill's visit to Moscow. With a view to the need for a stronger anti-Hitler coalition, however, the Soviet Government decided not to permit the further exacerbation of relations with its allies.

A month earlier the head of the Soviet Government had received a letter from Churchill reporting that no more military cargo would be shipped to the USSR by the northern route--the main route of military shipments to the Soviet Union. "Of course, I do not think," I. V. Stalin wrote in his reply to the English premier, "that regular transports to northern Soviet ports will be possible without risks and losses, but in a time of war no important task can be accomplished without risks and losses. You are certainly aware that the Soviet Union's losses are incomparably more serious. In any case, I cannot believe that the Government of Great Britain will refuse to deliver military equipment to us when the situation on the Soviet-German front is so serious."<sup>19</sup>

The enemy took advantage of the Western allies' passivity by launching a large-scale offensive on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in summer 1942. The enemy tried to burst through to the Caucasus and to Stalingrad in the hope of delivering a fatal blow to our country.

Under these conditions, the sabotage of the second front and other unscrupulous actions by the governments of England and the United States clearly indicated a desire to drain the Soviet Union of its strength and energy at a time when Hitler's command had concentrated all the force of the German military machine against it. England and the United States wanted to save their own strength at the expense of the USSR and to use their forces during the concluding stage of the war to conduct a policy of postwar diktat.<sup>20</sup>

The imperialist aims of the policy of U.S. and English ruling circles were vividly displayed in the controversy over the second front in Europe. For a long time, the prevailing view was that of the opponents of the active assistance of the USSR, the most reactionary anti-Soviet groups.

The year of 1943 began. This was the year of a radical reversal in the Great Patriotic War and World War II in general. The beginning of the year was

marked by the conclusion of the gigantic battle on the banks of the Volga. In fighting of colossal scales and unprecedented intensity over 200 days and nights, the Soviet Army broke the back of the select strategic group of German fascist troops. A brilliant encircling maneuver led to the defeat of an enemy force of 330,000. The enemy's total personnel losses in the Stalingrad battle numbered 1.5 million. This was a victory of worldwide historic significance and it had a decisive effect on the entire course of World War II.

The Western allies' first successes in North Africa and the stabilization of the situation in the Pacific were directly connected with events on the Soviet-German front. Fascist Germany personified the main strength of the aggressive bloc. The concentration of its principal forces on the Soviet-German front and the irreversible defeat they suffered in hand-to-hand combat with the Soviet Army excluded any possibility of support for the Italian-German forces in Africa, which were doomed to surrender. For the same reason, Germany could not give the Asian aggressor, militarist Japan, any practical assistance in its war with the United States. The fascist bloc's coalition strategy was left in ruins.

Nevertheless, the United States and England continued to delay the opening of the second front. After the Stalingrad battle, however, the Western powers' attitude toward the USSR acquired a new feature. Whereas they had previously taken a relatively calm view of the mutual bloodletting of Germany and the USSR, now they were worried about the implications of what they regarded as the premature defeat of the Wehrmacht. People in London and Washington began to realize that the USSR could not only withstand a struggle but could also win an independent victory over Germany and thereby acquire the right to an important role in postwar affairs. One of the leaders of the Communist Party of Great Britain wrote that "by 1943 the Western rulers were seized with panic at the thought of the possible fall of fascism and rise of communism."<sup>21</sup>

"There is no doubt," Soviet Ambassador M. M. Litvinov reported from Washington in reference to the issue of the second front, "that the military calculations of both states (the United States and England--O. R.) are built on the desire to deplete and exhaust the energy of the Soviet Union to the maximum in order to minimize its role in postwar decisionmaking. They will wait to see the development of military operations on our front."<sup>22</sup>

The Anglo-American conference in Casablanca (January 1943) proved that the allies were making no plans for any kind of serious attack on Germany in 1943. The invasion on the European continent was actually postponed until 1944, although conference resolutions made no specific references to this delay. A joint message sent by Churchill and Roosevelt to the head of the Soviet Government on 27 January to report the results of the conference was worded vaguely, contained no information about specific operations and did not mention any dates, but merely expressed the hope that "these operations, combined with your strong offensive, will probably force Germany to its knees in 1943."<sup>23</sup>

People in Moscow were well aware of the reasons for this "vagueness," and this is attested to by the request I. V. Stalin made in his letter of 30 January 1943 to Churchill and Roosevelt: "I understand your decisions with regard to

the defeat of Germany through the establishment of a second front in Europe in 1943 and I would be grateful for a report on the specific operations planned in this area and their projected dates. As for the Soviet Union, I can assure you that the USSR Armed Forces will do everything within their power," the head of the Soviet Government stressed, "to continue the offensive against Germany and its allies on the Soviet-German front." I. V. Stalin then went on to report the Soviet command's plans to conclude the winter campaign in the first half of February 1943.<sup>24</sup>

After consultations with Roosevelt, the English premier sent the head of the Soviet Government an optimistic reply: "We are also making energetic preparations, as far as our resources allow, for the Channel forcing operation in August, involving British and U.S. units. Tonnage and offensive amphibious equipment will also be limiting factors. If the operation has to be postponed as a result of the weather or other causes, preparations will be made for a more massive operation in September."<sup>25</sup>

Some Western historians have justifiably called this a deliberate deception.<sup>26</sup> While the governments of the United States and England continued to state their desire to open a second front in Europe in 1943, they were actually preparing for the continuation of military operations in the Mediterranean theater, located far from Germany. But this deception could not go on for long, and after their next meeting in Washington in May 1943,<sup>27</sup> Roosevelt and Churchill informed the head of the Soviet Government that the opening of the second front would be postponed until 1944.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to the issue of the second front, the decision by Churchill and Roosevelt to stop all shipments of materiel along the northern waterway on the specious pretext that the means of transport had to be used in the Mediterranean also exacerbated relations between the allies after the Soviet Government was informed of this decision on 30 March 1943.<sup>29</sup>

History repeated itself: On the threshold of the latest summer attack on the Wehrmacht, the allies announced another delay in the opening of the second front and reduced or completely stopped all shipments of military equipment to the USSR. This happened in 1942 and it happened again in 1943. The implications of this were obvious.

On 11 June the head of the Soviet Government sent Roosevelt a reply to his letter about the decisions made in Washington. A copy of the reply was also sent to Churchill. It said that the new delay in the Anglo-American invasion in Europe would "create exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which has already been at war for 2 years against the main forces of Germany and its satellites, using its main forces to the utmost, and would leave the Soviet Army, which is fighting for its own country and for its allies, on its own in what amounts to single combat with a still powerful and dangerous enemy. There is no need to say how severe and negative an impression this new postponement of the second front will have on the Soviet Union--on its people and its army--when our army, after making so many sacrifices, will be left without the serious support it expected from the English and American armies. As for the Soviet Government," I. V. Stalin wrote in conclusion, "it cannot agree



with this decision, which was made without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this extremely important matter, and which could have a ruinous effect on the future course of the war."<sup>30</sup>

A subsequent exchange of letters made the atmosphere even more tense: The Western allies had no convincing arguments to validate this sabotage of the second front. "I must tell you," I. V. Stalin wrote in a letter to Churchill on 24 June, a copy of which was also sent to Roosevelt, "that this is not simply a matter of disappointing the Soviet Government, but of maintaining its trust in the allies after it has been severely tried."<sup>31</sup>

At virtually the same time, information, which could more precisely be termed misinformation, began to come out of England and the United States to report that the operations planned by the allies in the Mediterranean (preparations were being made for an Anglo-American landing in Sicily) had allegedly forced the Wehrmacht to postpone its summer offensive on the Soviet-German front. When U.S. Secretary of State C. Hull spoke with USSR Acting Charge d'Affaires A. Gromyko a few days before the beginning of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, he expressed his doubts that Germany could launch a broad offensive on the Soviet-German front.<sup>32</sup> At the end of June English intelligence sent information to Moscow to assure the Soviet command that there would be no large-scale German offensive. The head of the English military mission in Moscow, General F. MacFarlane, reported to London on this matter: "We, however, decided not to turn this information over to the Russians right away. We were very lucky because the long-awaited German offensive began a few days later."<sup>33</sup>

The allies' preparations in the Mediterranean and the Sicily landing naturally did not change anything. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front and conducting the total mobilization of all forces and means, fascist Germany launched its third summer offensive against the Soviet Union on 5 July on the Kursk Bulge.

The enemy was pursuing far-reaching goals. Operational order No 6 to Wehrmacht headquarters on the preparations for the Kursk invasion, signed by Hitler, said: "Each commander and each soldier must be fully aware of the decisive significance of this offensive. A victory in Kursk would light a torch for the entire world."<sup>34</sup> In the event of success on the eastern front, the conquest of Sweden was planned, as well as the transfer of troops for the defeat of the Anglo-American forces preparing to invade Italy. American author M. Caidin ascertains that "Kursk was supposed to decide the fate of the Russians and the war in general."<sup>35</sup>

Hitler's command prepared for an operation of colossal strategic scales, but it was undermined by the capable and heroic actions of the Soviet Army. Taking the counteroffensive, Soviet troops routed the strongest enemy grouping of 30 select divisions. The Wehrmacht lost around 500,000 soldiers and officers, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 planes.<sup>36</sup> The Battle of Kursk put the strategic initiative firmly in the hands of the Soviet command. The victory in Kursk and the Soviet advance to the Dnieper ended with a drastic reversal in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II. Germany and its allies had

to take a defensive position in all theaters. On 6 August 1943, Roosevelt wrote to I. V. Stalin: "Throughout the month of gigantic battles, your armed forces with their mastery, their courage, their selflessness and their tenacity not only stopped the long-planned German offensive but also began a successful counteroffensive with far-reaching implications.... The Soviet Union can rightfully take pride in its heroic victories."<sup>37</sup>

The advance of Soviet troops to the state boundaries of the USSR testified that the war was coming to an end. The crisis in the fascist bloc was growing more pronounced and the national liberation movement was growing more active in the countries enslaved by the aggressors, thereby undermining the rear of Hitler's Germany.

The events of summer and fall 1943 on the Soviet-German front changed the entire military and political situation radically. It became obvious that the Soviet Union was able to free the people of Europe from the fascist yoke on its own. Western governments and military leaders had to acknowledge the need for an invasion of France across the English Channel in the fear that the Soviet Army would enter Central and Western Europe before their own troops. A Reuter Agency correspondent explained the reasons for the Quebec conference of the heads of government and representatives of the supreme command of the United States and England in August 1943:<sup>38</sup> "It is interesting that it was more likely the Red Army's summer victories than the Anglo-American successes in Tunisia and Sicily that dictated the need for the rapid revision of allied plans just 10 weeks after the Washington conference."<sup>39</sup> The final report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the conference in Quebec said that operation "Overlord" (the new name for operation "Roundup") would be the main Anglo-American land and air offensive against the European Axis powers (the start of the operation was scheduled for 1 May 1944).<sup>40</sup> This wording, adopted under pressure from U.S. military circles, was largely dictated by their fear of losing time for the preparations for their hegemonic postwar plans in Europe.

At the same time, the tendency to finally set a date for the opening of the second front created an opportunity for the improvement of relations between the USSR and the Western allies, especially the meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States. It was preceded by the Moscow conference of the Soviet, U.S. and British foreign ministers in October 1943.

In spite of all this, the question of a second front was absent from U.S. and English proposals on the Moscow conference agenda. Soviet diplomacy had to wage a difficult struggle, displaying maximum flexibility and persistence, to achieve the successful outcome of the conference. It was largely successful. One of the most important results was the signing of a "special secret protocol" on 1 November 1943, in which the United States and Great Britain reaffirmed their intention to organize an invasion in northern France in spring 1944.<sup>41</sup> But the danger of a new delay was still present as a result of several stipulations made by Western delegations. The final decision on the second front in Europe was made at the Tehran conference of the heads of the three allied powers in late November and early December 1943.

What were the positions of the sides prior to this historic meeting?

At a conference with the American chiefs of staff on 19 November 1943 on board the battleship "Iowa" on the way to Cairo to attend an Anglo-American-Chinese conference which preceded the meeting of the heads of the Soviet, U.S. and British governments in Tehran, President Roosevelt explained the need for a second front by saying that Soviet troops were only "60 miles from the Polish border and 40 miles from Bessarabia. If they should force the Bug, and they could do this within the next 2 weeks, the Red Army will be on the threshold of Romania." The President mentioned the urgent need to occupy as much of Europe as possible. He put France, Belgium, Luxembourg and southern Germany under English occupation. The United States, Roosevelt said, should occupy northwestern Germany. It could send its ships and troops to such ports as Bremen and Hamburg as well as to Norway and Denmark and move on to Berlin. "Then let the Soviets take the territory to the east. But Berlin must be taken by the United States."<sup>42</sup>

Churchill, just as Roosevelt, tried to keep Soviet troops from entering Western Europe, but he hoped to keep them out of the West by means of a landing in the Balkans. The position of English ruling circles was dictated by more than just their imperious interests. They wanted to forestall the Soviet Army in order to stifle the growing antifascist liberation struggle of the people of southeastern Europe and to impose reactionary regimes with an Anglo-American orientation on the countries of this region. English ruling circles were particularly disturbed by events in Yugoslavia and Greece, where the people's antifascist liberation struggle was then merging with the struggle of the broad laboring masses against the dominant classes in these countries and against the monarchic regimes that had taken refuge in London with the status of emigre governments.

The U.S. Government, however, believed that Churchill's Mediterranean strategy, which it had supported until the middle of 1943, had exhausted all of its possibilities. According to Washington, the English strategists' plans for an operation in the Balkans could cause Western troops to get stuck there while the Soviet Army liberated virtually all of Europe. "The second front in the West," American historian T. Higgins pointed out, "provided a chance to keep the Red Army out of the vitally important Ruhr and Rhine regions, and this could never have been accomplished by an invasion from the Mediterranean."<sup>43</sup> The United States and England had common class imperialist goals, but their views on the methods of attaining them differed.

Soviet policy was fundamentally different. The Government of the USSR, just as in the past, believed that the main element of the cooperation by the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition should be the coordination of military operations against their main adversary--fascist Germany--and the organization of concerted attacks from the east and west. The second front could lead to the attainment of projected goals only by means of a large-scale allied amphibious landing in the north of France and the advancement of allied troops to vitally important German centers, coordinated with an offensive by the Soviet Armed Forces. This would secure the quick defeat of the aggressor and the liberation of the European people from the fascist yoke.

In general, these were the positions of the sides on the issue of the second front just before the meeting of the Soviet, U.S. and British heads of government in Tehran from 28 November to 1 December 1943. It is not surprising that great difficulties arose at the first sessions. Churchill continued to insist on the "peripheral" strategy. The position of the United States, which supported the idea of a landing in the north of France, nevertheless remained vague. It sounded suspicious when Roosevelt proposed another operation in the northern Adriatic, which was objectively consistent with Churchill's "Balkan option." According to I. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet delegation, the USSR felt that "the best results will be produced by an attack on the enemy in northern or northwestern France," which was Germany's "weakest spot."<sup>44</sup>

The Soviet delegation had to insist on firm commitments regarding the second front from England and the United States. Finally, a decision was made in line with the main goal--the most rapid and effective completion of the destruction of the enemy through concerted effort. The extremely important final document, "The Military Decisions of the Tehran Conference" (classified), said that operation "Overlord" would be undertaken in May 1944 along with an operation against southern France. The document also recorded the statement by the head of the Soviet Government that "Soviet troops will take the offensive at approximately the same time to prevent the transfer of German forces from the eastern to the western front."<sup>45</sup>

A final decision was thereby made on the second front. The decisions on the organization of concerted attacks on Hitler's Germany signalled the triumph of the Soviet approach to the war and was in the interests of all nations and people fighting against fascist aggression.

The consistent support of the Soviet Union's demands for the opening of a second front without delay by the English and U.S. masses was of great importance in the attainment of this goal.

In the postwar years bourgeois historians tried to rationalize the failure of the United States and England to observe their commitment to establish a second front in the first years of the war. They have circulated mainly two versions of the story: According to the first, the United States made every effort to open the second front on schedule but was discouraged by England; in the second, the establishment of a new front against Germany was supposedly impossible in 1942 and 1943 due to the absence of the necessary forces and means.

In the semiofficial American work "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945," R. Coakley and R. Leighton write: "Churchill was truly an initiator, and Roosevelt was only a pawn in the policy of delaying the second front in northern France in 1942 and in the violation of the commitments England had assumed in April. As a result of this, preparations for the landing were postponed, and American troops began to be transferred from the British Isles to other theaters. American economic and other resources were dissipated, confusion reigned, and time and resources were lost in connection with the establishment of new supply lines and a new bridgehead for the invasion of North Africa."<sup>46</sup>

M. Howard presents an interesting view of the U.S. position on the second front in the book "Grand Strategy," which is among the official English works on the history of World War II. Refuting the official U.S. publications placing the blame for the failure to establish a second front in 1942-1943 on England, Howard tries to distribute the blame "equally." He quite cogently proves that while the American side was putting forth plans for the second front in 1942 and 1943, it was actually supporting England's policy on this matter. Commenting on the American strategic programs for 1943 in which the establishment of a second front was proposed, Howard remarks: "The American resources previously earmarked for operation 'Bolero' (the transfer of U.S. troops from the British Isles to the second front--O. R.) were sent to the Pacific, the Mediterranean and even to the Middle East, and this made the proposal of an invasion in Europe in 1943 unrealistic.... Now a new strategy had to be salvaged from the ruins of the old one."<sup>47</sup>

Ruling circles in the United States and England took Soviet interests into account only when they needed the help of the USSR. In several cases, the U.S. and English governments had to agree to concessions and compromises, but the hostile class nature of their policy toward the USSR did not change.

One important document in the National Archives of the United States is a record of the proceedings of a meeting of the combined Anglo-American staff on 20 August 1943, at which time future U.S. and English policy toward the USSR was discussed. The session was attended by top military leaders of the United States--Admiral W. Leahy, Generals G. Marshall and G. Arnold and Admiral E. King--and Great Britain--General A. Brooke, Admiral D. Pound and Air Force Marshall C. Portal. Paragraph 9 of the protocol "Military Considerations with Regard to Russia" says that they discussed the "possibility of help from the Germans" in the advancement of Anglo-American troops through German territory "to repulse the Russians."<sup>48</sup> It is difficult to believe that U.S. and English military leaders could cynically discuss something like this in 1943, when the Soviet Union was engaged in the fiercest combat with the fascist reich to pave the way for a victory by the anti-Hitler coalition. Nevertheless, this is what happened. Apparently, it is no coincidence that the document has still not been published and has not been mentioned in any official American study of World War II.

Furthermore, bourgeois historians maintain that the West European front allegedly played the same role as the Soviet-German front after the Western allies landed in Normandy, and some "hot-heads" assert that "Germany's military position became hopeless as soon as it failed to push the allied landing force back into the sea."<sup>49</sup> It is just as if the 3 years of fighting on the Soviet-German front, the fighting of unprecedented scales and intensity which had already completely and irreversibly decided the inevitable defeat of fascist Germany and all of its satellites before the allies landed, had never taken place. Even after the landing, the main battles of World War II were still being fought on the Soviet-German front. In June 1944 there were 4.3 million German fascist soldiers and officers on this front, while only around a million Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were in France and Italy. In summer and fall 1944 the Soviet Army pushed the front 600-900 kilometers to the west, destroyed and captured 96 enemy divisions and 24 brigades and routed 219 divisions and 22 brigades. Fascist Germany alone lost 1.6 million

soldiers and officers during this period. During the same period the allied troops destroyed enemy divisions. Even after the second front had been opened, fascist Germany kept its main troops in the east and suffered its greatest losses there.

The conclusion of Soviet historians that fascist Germany's military machine was put out of commission on the Soviet-German front is irrefutable. The absolute truth of this conclusion has been pointed out by some U.S. historians. S. Patrick writes in the book "The Russian Front. Germany's War in the East" that "only a few people in the West were able to conceive of the colossal scales of the war in the east" and that "Germany lost World War II on the fields of Russia, not in the hedges of Normandy."<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, the establishment of the second front and the subsequent combat operations by U.S., English, Canadian and French resistance forces made a substantial contribution to the anti-Hitler coalition's common cause and, what is most important, allowed for the coordination of attacks on the aggressor from the east and the west.

The USSR fulfilled its ally obligations and directed a series of powerful blows at the enemy in June and July 1944. On 10 June 1944, just 4 days after the beginning of operation "Overlord," troops on the Leningrad and Karelian fronts launched an offensive. The Soviet offensive in Belorussia, one of the most massive of World War II (operation "Bagration"), began on 23 June. The forces engaged in this colossal battle on both sides numbered 3.6 million men, over 45,000 firearms and mortars, 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns and 6,500 planes. The Soviet Armed Forces routed the German fascist Central Army during the course of this operation (June-August 1944) and advanced 550-600 kilometers, thereby giving Western troops invaluable assistance and support.

Ardennes is another example of strategic significance. On 16 December 1944 German fascist troops launched a powerful and sudden attack on Ardennes to rout the Anglo-American troops to the north of the Antwerp-Brussels-Luxembourg line. German tanks sent allied forces into a panic by disorganizing their defense and headed northwest through the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg. American divisions taken by surprise had to retreat. By 25 December the Germans had broken through the front of the American forces to a depth of 100 kilometers along an 80-kilometer section. The attacks of the German fascist were so fierce and the allied losses were so great that American General G. Patton wrote in his diary on 4 January 1945: "We could still lose this war."<sup>51</sup> At the beginning of January the position of American forces on the western front had been complicated by the German attack on Alsace.

On 6 January 1945 W. Churchill asked I. V. Stalin to launch a new Soviet offensive as quickly as possible to alleviate the tension on the western front.<sup>52</sup> D. Eisenhower reported to Washington that the absence of Soviet Army assistance would put American troops "in the most difficult position."<sup>53</sup>

On 12 January 1945 the Soviet Army began a new large-scale offensive from the Baltic to the Carpathian range 8 days ahead of schedule. By 28 January the German units debilitated by skirmishes in the east retreated to their earlier positions in Ardennes and Alsace and passed to the defensive.

The history of the second front occupies a special place among the events of World War II in 1939-1945. It reflects the struggle between two different lines in the anti-Hitler coalition--the line of the USSR, consistently aimed at the quickest possible defeat of the fascist militarist bloc through concerted effort, and the line of the Western allies, which subordinated the course of the war and the resolution of postwar problems to their own imperialist interests.<sup>54</sup>

The conflict between uniting and disuniting tendencies in the anti-Hitler coalition was a natural phenomenon. The political goals of the USSR, the main force in the alliance of states and people fighting against fascist aggression, and its substantial contribution to the defeat of the aggressors differed radically from the political goals and contribution of the other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. However, and this is most important, the military and political cooperation of the allied powers in the joint struggle against fascism led to victory. The German leaders expected the antifascist forces to split and felt that coordinated actions by them would be impossible, but they were wrong.

The popular resistance movement in areas of German, Italian and Japanese occupation, which was headed by communist and workers parties and took on particularly broad dimensions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, France, Greece, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines and a number of other countries, was the anti-Hitler coalition's natural ally. The coalition was also given substantial support by militant antifascist organizations under the leadership of communist parties in Italy, Romania, Bulgaria and even Germany. They made an important contribution to the eradication of the fascist regime in these countries.

The anti-Hitler coalition demonstrated the great potential of all-round cooperation by states with differing social structures for the attainment of major common goals. Goals of this kind are facing mankind today. The main one is the prevention of a nuclear world war, the threat of which is constantly being augmented by the aggressive policy of the Reagan Administration, which has openly declared a "crusade against communism" and a campaign to secure the dominant position in the world for U.S. monopolies. Whereas the plans for the devastation of communism by force and the establishment of world hegemony were made on the governmental level by the fascist bloc before and during World War II, now the ruling circles of the United States and its supporters in the NATO camp have taken up the banner of belligerent anticommunism. The lessons of history have apparently taught them nothing.

The Soviet Union is pursuing a different kind of policy, supported by all progressive forces in the world. "As a great socialist power, the Soviet Union is fully aware of its responsibility to keep and consolidate the peace," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K. U. Chernenko said at the February (1984) special plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "We are open to peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with the states of all continents. We advocate the peaceful resolution of all international disputes through serious, equitable and constructive negotiations. The USSR will cooperate to the utmost with all states prepared to take action to help in alleviating international tension and creating an atmosphere of trust in the world."<sup>55</sup>

The Soviet Union is firmly and unswervingly implementing precisely this policy line.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II 1939-1945], vol 9, Moscow, 1978, p 235.
2. Ibid., p 250. The preparations for the operation took around a year and a half. Over 2.8 million people were concentrated on the British Isles for the invasion. During the initial stages of the operation, 1.6 million soldiers and officers landed. The allies had 3 times as many personnel and tanks and more than 60 times as many planes and they completely ruled the sea. For more detail, see V. M. Kulish, "Istoriya vtorogo fronta" [The History of the Second Front], Moscow, 1971.
3. On 12 July 1941 the USSR and Great Britain signed an agreement on joint action in the war against Germany.
4. "Sovetsko-angliyskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945" [Soviet-English Relations During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], vol 1, 1941-1943, Moscow, 1983, p 85 (hereafter called "Sovetsko-angliyskiye otnosheniya...").
5. Ibid., p 89.
6. Ibid., p 112.
7. Ibid., p 114.
8. R. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins. An Eye-Witness Account," vol 1, Moscow, 1958, p 613.
9. I. N. Zemskov, "Diplomaticheskaya istoriya vtorogo fronta v Yevrope" [The Diplomatic History of the Second Front in Europe], Moscow, 1982, p 37.
10. Quoted in: W. Manchester, "American Caesar," N.Y., 1979, p 283.
11. J. Dean, "The Strange Alliance," N.Y., 1947, p 43.
12. "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (hereafter called "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR..."), vol 2, Moscow, 1976, p 18.
13. "Istoriya diplomatii" [Diplomatic History], vol 4, Moscow, 1975, p 265. Bourgeois historians often assert that the Western powers allegedly did



not give the Soviet Union a firm promise to open the second front in 1942. The pretext for this is a memorandum delivered by W. Churchill to V. M. Molotov on 10 June 1942, in which the British premier made the promise of a second front conditional upon a number of factors (the presence of special amphibious equipment, the guaranteed success of the operation, etc.). "However," Soviet researchers correctly point out, "the English prime minister's memorandum represented a unilateral statement and it cannot be viewed in isolation from negotiated joint communications and from the negotiation process as a whole, during the course of which the Soviet delegation made several sizeable concessions for the sake of reaching an agreement on the second front (reduced shipments and the exclusion of the recognition of the USSR's western border from the text of the Anglo-Soviet treaty)." I. N. Zemskov, *Op. cit.*, p 91.

14. This was Churchill's second Washington conference with Roosevelt, held from 18 to 25 June 1942.
15. The decision was the result of an exchange of letters between Churchill and Roosevelt and of the Anglo-American military talks in London on 20-25 July 1942.
16. D. Eisenhower, "Crusade in Europe," *tr fr Eng*, Moscow, 1980, p 106.
17. A. Harriman and E. Abel, "Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946," N.Y., 1975, p 146.
18. "Sovetsko-angliyskiye otnosheniya...", p 277.
19. "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR...", vol 1, pp 68-69.
20. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" [The History of USSR Foreign Policy], vol 1, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1980, pp 437-438.
21. Quoted in: V. G. Trukhanovskiy, "Antoni Iden" [Anthony Eden], Moscow, 1974, p 241.
22. Quoted in: I. N. Zemskov, *Op. cit.*, p 148.
23. "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR...", vol 1, pp 104-106.
24. *Ibid.*, p 108.
25. *Ibid.*, pp 112-113.
26. A. Levin, "British, American and Soviet Political Arms and Military Strategy, 1941-1945: A Study of the Beginnings of the Cold War," Ann Arbor, 1983, p 772.
27. This was Roosevelt's third Washington conference with Churchill (12-15 May 1943).

28. "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR...", vol 2, pp 66-68.
29. Ibid., vol 1, pp 132-133.
30. Ibid., p 159.
31. Ibid., pp 166-167.
32. Quoted in: I. N. Zemskov, Op. cit., p 191.
33. Public Record Office. FO 371/970, p 97.
34. "Kurskaya bitva" [The Battle of Kursk], Moscow, 1970, p 520.
35. M. Caidin, "The Tigers Are Burning," N.Y., 1974, p 8.
36. "Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopaedia], vol 4, Moscow, 1977, p 539.
37. "Perepiska pretsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR...", vol 2, p 77.
38. The conference took place from 14 through 24 August 1943.
39. Quoted in: "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny, 1939-1945," vol 7, Moscow, 1976, p 318.
40. H. Ehrman, "Grand Strategy, August 1943-September 1944," Moscow, 1958, p 44.
41. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet Union at International Conferences of the Period of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Collected Documents], vol 2, Moscow, 1978, the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, United States and Great Britain (19-30 October 1943), pp 365-367 (doc 96).
42. FRUS, "The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943," Wash., 1961, pp 259, 254.
43. T. Higgins, "Hitler and Russia," N.Y., 1966, p 283.
44. "Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945. Sbornik dokumentov," vol 2, Moscow, 1978, the Tehran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied Powers--USSR, United States and Great Britain (28 November-1 December 1943), p 97.
45. Ibid., p 173.
46. R. Coakley and R. Leighton, "Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945," Wash., 1968, p 272.

47. M. Howard, "Grand Strategy, August 1942-September 1943," tr fr Eng, Moscow, 1980, p 161.
48. National Archives of the United States. Record Group 218, CCS 113 Meeting, p 6.
49. "Chronology of World War II," compiled by C. Argyle, N.Y., 1982, p 161.
50. "The Russian Front. Germany's War in the East, 1941-1945," London, 1978, p 55.
51. G. Patton, "War as I Knew It," Boston, 1947, p 213.
52. "Perepiska predsdatel'ya Soveta Ministrov SSSR...", vol 1, pp 348-349.
53. "The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower," Baltimore and London, 1970, vol 4, p 2407.
54. For more detail, see V. L. Israelyan, "Antigitlerovskaya koalitsiya" [The Anti-Hitler Coalition], Moscow, 1964.
55. KOMMUNIST, 1984, No 3, p 12.

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## U.S. ACCUSED OF VIOLATING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 24 May 84) pp 59-63

[Article by V. P. Abarenkov: "Who Is Failing To Observe Negotiated Agreements"]

[Text] At the beginning of the year President Reagan sent a report to the U.S. Congress in an attempt to blame the Soviet Union for the "nonobservance" of arms control agreements. It is indicative that this demarche was undertaken at a time when the United States is building up its entire arsenal of strategic arms at an unprecedented rate and has adopted a program for the stepped-up deployment of such systems as the Midgetman and MX ICBM's, the Trident nuclear missile submarines, the Stealth and B-1B bombers, the air-, sea- and land-based long-range cruise missiles and the space shuttle.

If we take a careful look at the content of the report in general and at the manner and time of its submission, we will clearly see that the current administration has nothing to tell the voters in this campaign year about its advances in the sphere of "arms control."

It was precisely through the efforts of the Reagan "team" that the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of the arms race were obstructed. They were obstructed by this administration's policy on "arms control" and by its entire approach to problems in Soviet-American relations. This is the reason for the attempt to divert the attention of the American voters and to slander the USSR in order to conceal its own reluctance to seriously negotiate arms limitation and reduction with the Soviet Union.

The time that the report was made public is also indicative: It was on the eve of Ronald Reagan's official declaration of his intention to run for a second term and immediately after the Geneva talks had been cut off through the fault of the administration. This was another of Reagan's campaign maneuvers, designed to indirectly accuse the Democrats of negotiating poorly with the USSR and being "weak" enough to sign an agreement the Russians were now allegedly violating.

In other words, what we are dealing with here are intensely demagogic political maneuvers by the Reagan "team" in areas of some importance to the security interests of the United States itself.

It is also a striking fact that this was an operation planned in advance. As early as 1983, the question of the Soviet Union's observance of agreements was raised in the Congress, and the Congress requested the administration to submit a report on this matter. At the beginning of December, Director K. Adelman of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency informed the press that he had almost completed a report accusing the USSR of the "nonobservance" of agreements, particularly the SALT-II Treaty. The NEW YORK TIMES reported on 7 December that the administration was conducting an intensive search for "valid" proof.

If the current administration had ever had a sincere desire to clear up matters connected with the Soviet Union's fulfillment of commitments stemming from any particular agreement, this could have been done in the calmer atmosphere of diplomatic consultations or through the standing consultative commission,\* particularly since this commission was perfectly capable until 1981--that is, until the start of the current administration--of the satisfactory resolution of all problems arising on both sides (I repeat, on both) in connection with negotiated commitments.

Judging by all indications, however, the Reagan Administration had no interest in clarifying the situation. According to Senator J. Biden, it deliberately avoided using this commission for the investigation of such matters, particularly in connection with the fulfillment of the SALT-II Treaty. Even before this report was sent to the Congress, officials began to publicize it as much as possible. It should be noted that the United States has systematically violated the negotiated principle of confidentiality in the discussion of matters connected with strategic arms limitation commitments, and this has certainly disrupted the normal functioning of the Soviet-American standing consultative commission.

Washington also violated this principle at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva--both the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe and START. We should recall that the Reagan Administration began the talks on the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons by informing the public of the "zero" option in November 1981; in May 1982 American START proposals were also made public.

However, it is a well-known fact (this has been acknowledged by former U.S. Presidents R. Nixon and G. Ford and former Secretary of State C. Vance) that violations of the principle of confidentiality have always slowed down the negotiation process or have even reversed it because the United States has no shortage of opponents of any Soviet-American agreement, particularly in the sphere of arms limitation. With the aid of the mass media, these individuals are capable of misrepresenting the course of the process, the essential positions of the sides and the as yet unnegotiated details of future agreements.

When the administration made the report on "nonobservance" public, it was obviously addressing the uninformed. Informed individuals and experts,

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\* This is the commission created to aid in the implementation of the goals and provisions of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, concluded on 26 May 1972, and the Soviet-U.S. Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Danger of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971. Sessions are held periodically in Geneva--Editor's note.

including American ones, immediately realized the falsity of the allegations that the Soviet Union was violating commitments. One indication of this was a press conference held by G. Smith and P. Warnke, former directors of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who headed U.S. SALT delegations at different times, Brookings Institution researcher J. Steinbruner, Carnegie Foundation spokesman M. Krepon and former Assistant CIA Director H. Scoville. They unanimously declared that the accusations leveled at the USSR in the report "are not reinforced by facts, are irrelevant from the military standpoint and are imprudent from the diplomatic standpoint."

There was also another reaction to the report in the United States, and it is also indicative in its own way. The people who oppose arms limitation agreements in general seized upon the report as more "proof of Moscow's unreliability" and took it as a signal for a new campaign about the inadequate verification means from which earlier agreements allegedly suffer. On these grounds they oppose agreements to ban chemical weapons and antisatellite systems: They say that it would be impossible to verify their fulfillment.

As for the content of the report, the most striking feature is the profusion of such phrases as "possible violations," "conflicting reports," "no specific conclusions" and so forth. They are the clearest indication that Washington has no facts to prove that the Soviet Union is not observing its commitments. It is obvious that the report is an attempt to draw attention away from the United States' own violations of international commitments.

And these have not been few in number. The Soviet embassy in Washington informed the American side of them in the memorandum delivered to the U.S. State Department and published on 30 January in the Soviet press. What are the specific incidents?

First of all, although the United States signed the treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-II) in 1979, it never put the treaty in force. Its obstructionist behavior prevented the implementation of a significant element of the agreement, pertaining to matters mentioned in the protocol to the treaty and constituting an integral part of the treaty: The United States did not abide by the provisions stipulating the negotiation of mutually acceptable solutions with regard to sea- and land-based long-range cruise missiles. Now it can be said with complete justification that it did this in order to have a free hand for the massive deployment of these cruise missiles.

Furthermore, as C. Vance said in his book published in 1983, the United States specifically requested that the treaty be enforced for only a short time (until 31 December 1981) so that it would expire at the precise time when the United States would already be capable of deploying long-range cruise missiles, particularly air- and sea-based ones.

What is more, when the United States began to deploy the Pershing-II missiles and the land-based long-range cruise missiles in Europe (and this was an obvious addition to the American strategic offensive arsenal), it committed another violation of the SALT-II Treaty, by which the sides pledged "not to circumvent treaty provisions through any other state or states or in any other manner" and "not to assume any international commitments inconsistent

with" the treaty. It is clear that the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing-II missiles in Western Europe is in no way consistent with the U.S. pledge to refrain from actions undermining the SALT-II Treaty.

There is also reason for doubts about Washington's proper observance of at least a few provisions of the 1972 Interim Agreement. For example, the United States instituted the practice of using shelters for ICBM launchers. The USSR repeatedly asked the United States to refrain from using shelters for Minuteman-2 and Titan-2 ICBM launchers because this would impede the effective verification by national monitoring equipment, and the two sides had agreed not to create such impediments.

Serious worries have been aroused, for example, by the prolonged use of such shelters for Minuteman-2 silos. It was revealed that this was done for the purpose of concealing preparations for the re-equipping of these launch sites. The re-equipped sites are virtually identical to the launchers of the MIRV'ed Minuteman-3, and we can assume that these are the missiles deployed in these silos. If this is the case, then the United States' defiant and outright nonobservance of provisions pertaining to the monitoring of the SALT-I agreement is simultaneously a violation of one of the main SALT-II treaty commitments regarding the limitation of the number of MIRV'ed ICBM's.

The United States' plans to develop two new ICBM's (the MX and the Midgetman) are also inconsistent with the goals of strategic arms limitation, which were recorded in earlier Soviet-American agreements.

The USSR has repeatedly called the United States to account for its observance of the permanent ABM treaty. For example, the United States clearly violated the commitments of this treaty when it set up a large radar station on the island of Shemya\* and used elements tested for antiballistic missile defense purposes in the erection of this station. In addition, it has used shelters for ABM launchers, is working on the development of mobile ABM radar stations and space-based ABM systems, is testing the Minuteman-1 ICBM for the purpose of giving it ABM capabilities, is developing multiple warheads for ABM weapons, etc.

In spite of a pledge not to deploy ABM systems within national territory and not to lay the foundation for this kind of defense, the United States is nevertheless setting up new and large radar stations on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the south. Their parameters meet the requirements of ABM stations and they could serve as a basis for a radar ABM system within U.S. territory.

This is also the purpose of the massive ABM system that was announced officially in March 1983. At the press conference mentioned above, G. Smith had good reason to state that he was particularly worried about the Reagan Administration's apparent intention to make a complete break with ABM treaty commitments. The Federation of American Scientists has also warned repeatedly that the administration's behavior could pose a threat to this treaty.

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\* Shemya is the last island in the Aleutian chain and is located 450 kilometers from the Kamchatka Peninsula--Editor's note.

According to reports in the American press, President Reagan signed Directive No 119 on 6 January 1984, officially ordering the commencement of a stepped-up research program for the purpose of a space-based ABM system. The administration has requested 2.6 billion dollars for this purpose in fiscal year 1985, or 25-30 percent more than it planned prior to the assignment of priority to this program as the main U.S. objective in coming years. In all, according to Pentagon estimates, the cost of deploying this system will total around 100 billion dollars by the end of the century. These are truly cosmic dimensions.

It is clear that the disruption of the organic connection between limitations on defensive and offensive strategic arms would have the most negative affect on the future limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

The United States is guilty of the nonobservance or violation of other negotiated commitments as well.

The memorandum of the USSR embassy in Washington said that the Soviet side has evidence that the American side has repeatedly surpassed the maximum nuclear test strength stipulated in the 1974 Soviet-American treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. This has also been reported in the American press. For example, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (No 3, 1983) reported that the United States had "conducted a nuclear warhead testing program with a suspected force of 150 kilotons above the level stipulated in the Soviet-U.S. threshold agreement."

The U.S. approach to the ban on chemical weapons is also indicative. It was precisely the U.S. position at the beginning of the 1970's that prevented the prohibition of chemical weapons at the same time as bacteriological ones, as the USSR and its allies had proposed. Although the 1972 convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (or biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction obligated the United States to continue negotiations for a rapid agreement on effective measures to prohibit chemical weapons, it has actually refrained from doing this. This is understandable if we consider that the United States instituted a chemical re-arming program with the aim of augmenting its chemical weapon arsenal from 3 million units to 5 million.

The attitude of the United States in general and of the current administration in particular toward commitments stemming from bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements on arms limitation, particularly in light of the United States' intensive escalation of the arms race, has worried the world community more and more in recent years. Judging by all indications, the Reagan Administration has taken on the ignoble mission of shaking, undermining and perhaps destroying the entire system of international treaties and agreements in this area and of destroying all of the positive features Soviet-American relations accumulated over many years. Now all of the elements of this system are interrelated. If just one brick is removed from its foundation, the entire edifice will suffer colossal damage. It appears that M. Krepon was justified when he stressed at the abovementioned press conference that the current administration's behavior could cause the collapse of the entire



"structure of existing arms limitation treaties and cancel out the possibility of new ones."

These agreements are just as necessary to the United States, however, as to others. "The question of the U.S. attitude toward commitments is growing increasingly serious and urgent," the memorandum of the Soviet embassy in Washington said. "The Soviet side is not raising it for the sake of argument. This discussion deals with extremely important matters, primarily trust. If the American side actually is interested, as it has said it is, in the continuation of an effective arms limitation process, it must draw the proper conclusions from all of this."

Washington's nearsighted policy and unscrupulous tactics are directly endangering the process of arms limitation in which all people, including the Americans, have a vital interest.

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# POLICY STATEMENT BY DEMOCRATIC PARTY LEADERS VIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 24 May 84) pp 64-71

[Article by I. A. Geyevskiy: "The Democrats in Search of a Program"]

[Text] A lengthy document entitled "America Must Rekindle Hope--The Program of the Democrats of Our Nation" has been published in the United States. The document was prepared in the form of a report by a group of influential Democratic Party officials and Democratic congressmen--G. Long, R. Strauss, T. O'Neill, C. Manatt and T. Coelho. It is not an official party platform; this will be adopted at the party convention in the summer. Nevertheless, the report setting forth the views of influential Democrats warrants attention because it reflects the United States' most urgent economic, social and foreign policy problems and the struggle that is now being waged over them.

Just as any other American campaign document, this report is something like a puff pastry. It contains a 200-year-old group of rhetorical propaganda cliches--an invariable element of the campaign declarations of all bourgeois parties--such as "America is a symbol of liberty," "America is a symbol of hope" and "America represents equality by birth and equality in opportunities for growth and prosperity." By tradition, the document attacks the rival party. Finally, it also has the usual short-range goal of all campaign declarations--the solicitation of voter support. Vague promises are made to the American voters in appealing terms, such as the following: "We ask you to consider this program, which is based on such principles as hope, growth, positive opportunities, peace, a common destiny and a desire for perfection." What can we say, even any Republican could probably subscribe to these declarations!

If the document consisted only in a repetition of shopworn but slightly updated declarations and promises, it would hardly warrant any attention. The report begins, however, with the meaningful statement that it "signifies a total break with the Democratic Party's recent slogans, but not with its traditional values." This statement could be regarded as a tactical campaign maneuver, but the document notes that it represents an attempt to analyze the current problems of American capitalism. In this respect, the appearance of the report is both symptomatic and natural.

The dominant class in the United States has long had every reason to be seriously worried. The intensification of the general crisis of capitalism has had a particularly strong impact in the United States. In the 1960's the nation experienced its most severe sociopolitical crisis. Economic problems have been growing more severe since the end of the 1960's. The nation has experienced one cyclical production crisis after another, interspersed with structural crises. The existing machinery of state-monopoly regulation has displayed increasing inefficiency, and the U.S. position in the world capitalist economy has grown perceptibly weaker. American capitalism has been stricken by a severe multifaceted crisis. Under these conditions, the dominant class placed its hopes in conservative methods of escaping the morass of accumulated problems. Three years of the implementation of these methods under the Reagan Administration have not satisfied a specific segment of U.S. ruling circles. Realistic bourgeois officials cannot take comfort in brilliant propaganda rhetoric while closing their eyes to the continuous exacerbation of domestic and foreign problems.

Foreign political and military problems are discussed in detail in the document. The authors undiscerningly reiterate anti-Soviet ideas differing little from the White House's propaganda cliches, and they repeat the traditional Washington rhetoric that "America wants peace" and that it "must be strong" to achieve this. At the same time, they present realistic criticism of several major aspects of the Republican administration's foreign policy and accuse the administration of misunderstanding or ignoring all of the complexity of contemporary international relations: "Having neither a precisely planned strategy nor experienced strategists to make policy, the administration is distorting the real state of affairs in the world to fit its own oversimplified pattern, in accordance with which crises and many situations which are not necessarily critical are indiscriminately viewed only within the context of competition between the superpowers. With its inability to interpret events as anything other than confrontation between East and West, the administration has ruined our relations with the Soviet Union without strengthening our ties with friends or improving our prospects in the Third World."

The authors of the document realize that the administration's efforts to use military strength as the main instrument of foreign policy in today's world are not only futile but could also produce results representing the direct opposite of those anticipated in the White House. The reliance on the "big stick" and the reluctance to agree to reasonable compromises and to seek mutually acceptable solutions have weakened the United States' international position. The results of administration foreign policy activity, according to the authors of the document, are a "record of failures."

They are particularly worried about U.S. security. They have called the administration's efforts to attain military superiority for the purpose of "winning" a nuclear war dangerous and futile, and they have criticized its obvious lack of interest in nuclear arms limitation talks with the USSR. As an alternative, the authors suggest that steps be taken to resume the talks with the USSR and to broaden the group of negotiation items with a view to the fact that success in the talks "can be achieved only if American and Soviet interests are taken into account"; that earlier treaties be ratified

(the SALT-II Treaty, the 1974 treaty limiting underground nuclear tests, and others); that an agreement be reached on mutual and satisfactory verification of the moratorium on the testing and production of nuclear warheads and of missiles and other nuclear weapon delivery systems. Although some of the proposals and assessments in the program are debatable, on the whole its authors reject the administration's current adventurist line and advocate the relaxation of international tension.

It is interesting that many similar or essentially identical statements are made in another document--"The Prevention of Nuclear War: A Strategy for Peace." Its authors--Senator A. Cranston and other Democratic Party officials--also propose that their document be included in the Democratic Party platform. Criticizing the administration's attempts to achieve nuclear superiority, they advocate peaceful coexistence and assert that the U.S. Government's primary objectives should be the prevention of nuclear war, the reversal of the arms race and the safeguarding of national and international security. Senator Cranston and his co-authors propose a moratorium on the testing and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems and the negotiation of a freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear arms and suggest that the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. All of this testifies to a realization of the dangerous and adventurist nature of the Reagan Administration's present policy line.

Returning to the first document, the report by the group of prominent Democrats, we should point out their comprehensive approach to current problems. They stress the interconnection and interdependence of economic and social problems in the United States, the arms race and foreign political and foreign economic objectives, which are all closely interwoven. They try to reveal the intricate connections between what might seem to be purely domestic American problems (for example, the state of public education) and global developments. The bitter experience of the past and present proves that any attempt to view the United States as the center of the universe, which it can command with the aid of the nuclear big stick, is futile in today's world and is hazardous primarily to the United States itself. This is the reason for the authors' attempt to determine the United States' place in the global system of coordinates, current trends in the world and their implications for the United States.

This analysis and these conclusions do not always paint an objective picture of the world. They reflect the limited outlook of the report's authors. Nevertheless, they are fully aware of the flaws in the current administration's policy. These include the frustrated hope of simultaneously lowering taxes and escalating military spending while balancing the budget; the attempt to make sharp cuts in federal programs of aid to the underprivileged without aggravating social relations; the attempts to solve problems with deep social, economic, ethnic, religious and other roots in the international arena with the aid of force. This approach, according to the authors, cannot produce any long-term solutions to any of American capitalism's problems. It can only perpetuate the deterioration of U.S. influence in the international arena.

What worries the document's authors the most? Above all, it is the results and prospects of U.S. economic development: "The most important economic problem

for us in 1984 will consist not in recovery from severe depression but in the construction of a solid foundation for stable, inflation-free economic growth over the long range." The final goal is "to keep America the undisputed economic leader in the world."

In general, the document's authors present an objective analysis of the results of American economic development in the 1970's and 1980's: "Throughout this period our economy resembled a roller coaster, either sliding downhill into the depths of recession and high unemployment or climbing uphill to the peaks of inflation. After each recession the state of the economy was worse than before. Neither the macro- nor micro-economic measures of the Republican and Democratic administrations of this period could put the nation on the road to steady growth."

In other words, they acknowledge the failure of the policy of both parties, whose representatives headed the Washington administration during that period. The document cites many examples to corroborate this conclusion. In particular, it lists the following as chronic problems:

The dramatic drop in the growth rate of labor productivity: The annual rate of increase was 3.3 percent on the average between 1947 and 1965, 2.4 percent between 1965 and 1972, and 0.2 percent in the 5 years between 1977 and 1982;

The constant growth of unemployment: After each crisis since 1970 the rate of unemployment has climbed. It was 4.9 percent after the 1969-1970 crisis, 5.8 percent after the 1973-1975 crisis and, according to extremely optimistic forecasts, after the crisis of 1980-1982 it will be 7.5 percent in 1986. The current cyclical upswing is leading only to the temporary acceleration of labor productivity growth. Unless serious steps are taken, it cannot solve the problem by itself. The fact that this problem is unsolved is complicating the U.S. position in world markets, where, according to the authors, it is being beaten "right and left."

Thirty years ago half of the goods in the entire world were manufactured in the United States. Now its share constitutes only one-fifth of the world industrial product. Japan and Western Europe have taken over a sizeable share of the world markets for automobiles, steel and machine tools. The United States is losing ground to its main competitors, and competition from other industrially developed countries is growing increasingly menacing.

Analyzing the factors inhibiting the steady growth of the American economy--huge deficits, unemployment, the threat of a new spurt of inflation, high interest rates, the high exchange rate of the dollar, the absence of economic recovery outside the United States and the indebtedness of the Third World countries (they owe American banks around 150 billion dollars)--the authors stress the need to "work out a definite policy on each of these problems." The struggle to lower the huge "Reagan budget deficits" is called a primary objective and a necessary condition for economic growth.

Without attempting to paraphrase all of the specific points in the economic portion of the Democratic program, we will mention some of its basic

principles. First of all, there is the insistence on a more important role for government: The federal administration must "take the lead" in engineering a general economic strategy on specific economic problems, increase government investments in scientific research and so forth. Secondly, the administration should play the deciding role in changing the sociopolitical climate in the nation.

The authors of the document do not actually admit that employers have launched an all-out attack on labor unions and on the standard of living of the laboring public with the direct support and assistance of the Reagan Administration. Judging by all indications, however, they feel that this harsh anti-labor policy, which is exacerbating the class struggle in the country, is not consistent with the objective of economic recovery and growth: "It is most essential that the administration take the lead in establishing a national consensus with regard to government policy, which will stimulate and promote the growth of the private sector."

The authors repeatedly stress that the continued unrestrained escalation of military spending (the administration has requested 1.8 trillion dollars for the 1984-1988 period) will make the sharp reduction of the budget deficit within the next few years impossible and will make the plans for economic development on a strong foundation all the more invalid. Bourgeois reformists are also disturbed by the domestic political consequences of the unprecedented increase in military appropriations, which has nullified the material basis of the policy of social maneuvering. Proceeding from this assumption, they feel that the rate of increase in military spending should not exceed the economic growth rate. The authors propose an increase of 3-5 percent a year (in real terms) in military spending until the completion of a "total reassessment of American military strategy and tactics."

To solve the problem of budget deficits (according to the moderate estimates of the Congressional Budget Office, they will total 1.33 trillion dollars in 1984-1989 unless there is a change in current policy!), the authors propose cuts in so-called compensation payments and a rise in taxes.

The authors examine fiscal problems from the sociopolitical standpoint as well as the economic one. They acknowledge that "rich Americans benefited most" from the current administration's tax cuts. The tax burden of the lowest-income population groups was augmented by 24 percent as a result of Reagan's "cuts." In general, Reagan's reform hurt around 60 percent of the taxpayers and benefited 20 percent, mainly the wealthy elite. The proportion accounted for by corporate taxes was cut even more dramatically. Hundreds of companies now pay no taxes at all. Using more than a hundred loopholes in the tax laws, rich people and corporations are underpaying over 250 billion dollars a year in taxes.

Criticizing Reagan's tax reform, the authors propose an alternative that might appeal to the laboring public without posing any particular threat to the interests of monopolist capital. It is not a simple matter to slice the national income pie and decide how big a piece each class and each social group should receive. Reagan's reform gave rich people and corporations a much larger slice. The authors of the document assert that they recognize

the need to lighten the tax burden of the laboring public to some degree and to deprive corporations of a number of privileges. In their opinion, this must be done in the interests of the development of the U.S. capitalist economy as a whole, since existing privileges have led to a situation in which "investments are often made not for intelligent economic reasons but for the payment of lower taxes." When Ronald Reagan instituted a number of tax privileges for corporations and wealthy Americans, however, he said that they would stimulate investments, economic recovery and growth....

The authors of the report propose that existing tax laws be replaced with "a new and simplified fair law." They explain to capitalists that "fair taxes will put capital at the service of economic growth" and promise them that "the rates for corporations and the highest rates for private individuals will be the same, but both will be lower than they are now." At the same time, workers are being assured that "the majority of taxpayers will be in the lowest tax bracket."

The inconsistent and even contradictory nature of this fiscal program is obvious. As bourgeois reformists, the authors want to keep the wolves satisfied and the sheep unharmed. But can this approach secure the necessary revenues, eliminate budget deficits, stimulate economic growth and carry out all of the social programs the document promises various population groups (better medical care, aid to the aged and disadvantaged, expanded housing construction, etc.)? The authors feel that the return to bourgeois reformism in government policy is an essential condition for economic development: "A stable process cannot be achieved on the shaky foundation of a society of growing hunger and poverty, continued unemployment and diminished opportunities, a society in which the government is indifferent to the needs of poor families, engenders a permanent class of vagrants and creates the threat of social fragmentation."

The Democrats' entire document is permeated with the spirit of anxiety over the exacerbation of the social situation in the country. As representatives of the rival bourgeois party, they are naturally pleased, particularly now that the campaign has begun, with the unpopularity of the Republican administration's domestic policy. But as members of the dominant class, they can see that the continuation of administration policy could have dangerous political implications for the entire class as a whole. The masses are growing more radical. Their dissatisfaction is taking on dimensions and forms undermining the stability of the bourgeois society. Virtually all segments of the laboring public have become more active. This is also true of all democratic movements--the labor movement, the movement of black and Hispanic Americans, the women's movement, the movements of senior citizens, the unemployed and others, not to mention the strong antiwar and antinuclear movement encompassing all strata of the population and all parts of the country. The very fact that even the rightwing leaders of the AFL-CIO, who have always rejected extraparliamentary methods of struggle, had to head a march of half a million people on Washington in September 1981 testifies to an increasingly pronounced leftward shift within the masses.

The further development of these tendencies as a result of the Republican administration's conservative policy could lead to dangerous upheavals. Of

course, the authors of the document do not specifically mention this, but they cannot conceal their worries about the processes of social polarization. This is reflected in their appeals for "national unity," for a "unified society" and for "an end to the subversion of social foundations."

The authors of the document criticize the administration's social policy from the standpoint of bourgeois reformism. This criticism reflects the differences of opinion that have existed within the bourgeoisie for a long time with regard to the methods of pursuing social policy. The final goal of this policy is the prevention of social upheavals and the reinforcement of the bases of the capitalist society. All segments of the ruling elite agree with this general goal. There are differences of opinion, however, with regard to the methods and means of its attainment. The Reagan Administration expresses the views of the particular segment of the bourgeoisie that believes that too many socioeconomic and political concessions were made to the laboring masses since the time of Roosevelt's New Deal, that new reforms should be denied, that many of the previous gains of the laboring public should be eliminated and that repressive measures should be used more widely to stifle protest demonstrations.

The document cites impressive data on some of the results of administration policy in the social sphere: The losses suffered by workers in connection with the rise in unemployment exceeded 179 billion dollars between 1980 and 1982; the number of Americans living in a state of poverty rose by 5.1 million in 1981 and 1982 and reached 34 million; more than one-third of all the families headed by women, almost half of all black children and one out of every six white children now live in poverty. Under the cover of false statements about "reducing government waste," the administration launched an all-out attack on social assistance programs. According to the data of the Congressional Budget Office, expenditures on social programs for 1982-1985 were cut by 110 billion dollars (including cuts of 26.8 billion in financial security programs for the retired and disabled, 18.5 billion dollars in medical programs, and 25 billion in employment and occupational training programs). The administration insisted on much larger cuts, but some of them were rejected by the Congress.

The Democrats who wrote the document regard this policy as something inconsistent with the long-range interests of American capitalism. Economic considerations have played a role here. For example, cuts in federal education appropriations (14 percent in the 1980-1983 period) affect the children of low-income families and inhibit the growth of labor productivity by preventing the improvement of the quality of education. Furthermore, the administration's insistence on sharp cuts in various assistance programs is precluding the attainment of one of the bourgeois reformists' main goals--"national harmony"--and could even "rock the boat" dangerously.

It must be said that the social programs were not a gift to the workers from the bourgeois government. Each has a long history of persistent struggle by the masses. In contrast to hardheaded conservatives, bourgeois reformists realize the expediency of making some concessions to the masses and of making small sacrifices for the sake of a certain level of internal stability in the bourgeois society. The Reagan Administration's attempts to deprive the workers



of many of their gains with a few blows of the budget axe are exacerbating social antagonism in the country. According to the authors of the document, the government must promote "cooperation" between labor and capital and take measures "to make the leading forces in our economy work together, and not against one another."

"The encouragement of the business community, labor unions, specialists and the administration to form a new partnership for the sake of economic growth" is recommended as one of the main practical ways of attaining this goal. The creation of an economic cooperation council as a representative and independent body is proposed. It should work out strategy on economic development and "secure the united support of this strategy by the government, the business community and the unions." It must be said that this idea is not a new one. Attempts were already made in the past to establish trilateral bodies of this kind. Their activity was confined to joint attempts by government and business to pressure the working class to make new sacrifices.

The main purpose of the Democratic proposals is the enhancement of the competitive potential of the American economy within the country and in world markets and the thorough reinforcement of American capitalism. The authors want to rid it of all the flaws organically inherent in the capitalist order without undermining its bases. They also promise to make the United States "a healthy society with a secure future" and to turn it "into a model for the entire world." Without putting an end to monopolist domination or even restricting the authoritarianism of monopolies, they promise to "secure economic and social justice for all citizens"--no more and no less.

On the whole, the document reflects the disillusionment of some bourgeois officials with current administration policy. In their opinion, this policy is intensifying social polarization, weakening the American economy, increasing the danger of nuclear catastrophe and undermining the security of the United States and its economic and political positions in the world. In other words, it is contrary to the fundamental long-range interests of American capitalism.

In the late 1970's and early 1980's many political scientists announced that the United States had entered an "age of conservatism" (in its Reagan variety) and interpreted Reagan's election victory as something just short of a national "conservative consensus." They ignored the deep-seated contradictions in his economic programs, the implications of the unrestrained growth of military expenditures and the adventurism of his foreign policy and his anti-labor and antidemocratic domestic policy. All of these features of administration policy, superimposed on the objective exacerbation of American capitalism's domestic and international problems, naturally produced the previously discussed negative effects. Under these conditions, the intensification of the struggle within ruling circles over fundamental long-range problems in U.S. domestic and foreign policy can be seen clearly behind the facade of inter-party rivalry.

Of course, the current state of affairs, particularly in the economy, is of profound interest to the entire U.S. ruling class and to both bourgeois

parties. The temporary improvement in some spheres (for example, the current rise in production growth rates) is particularly important to the ruling party, but many bourgeois officials are trying to look into the nation's future. The Democrats are proposing their own long-term strategy.

The questions raised in the Democratic policy statement are dictated by reality and by worries about the future of American capitalism.

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